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Abstract
The thesis examines the effect of deregulation on passenger demand and airline supply of the top
25 long-haul U.S. domestic markets by measuring the annual and overall percentage changes in
passenger traffic, airfare, nonstop flight frequency, total nonstop seat capacity, and average
aircraft size over the time period between 1987 and 1995, and quantifying the relationships
between these parameters. The correlations between these parameters are obtained by developing
non-linear regression models.
Within this time period, aggregate passenger demand of the total 25 markets increased by 3.5%
annually and 30% overall. Inflation adjusted airfares of the majority of the top 25 markets
decreased very slightly, only 0.03% annually and 2.32% overall. However, airfares tended to
increase for the markets associated with hub airports because the dominant airline at that hub
station has greater power to increase fare levels. Nonstop frequency increased at about the same
rate as passenger demand across the nine-year period, given that there were approximately 1,000
more flights per week in 1995 than in 1987 in these markets. The total nonstop seat capacity of
the total 25 markets increased by 90,000 seats per week since 1987, which represents 1.85%
annually and 14.42% overall. Average aircraft size for the top 25 market decreased by 0.88%
annually and 7% overall.
From the results of the correlation analysis, passenger demand of the top 25 markets is price-
elastic, especially of the vacation city-pair markets. On the contrary, passenger demand of the
hub-related and business markets is rather insensitive to changes in airfare since both demand and
fare increased over time. Interestingly, nonstop frequency has a strong impact on how airlines
allocate seat capacity and aircraft size, not passenger demand. Because flight frequency
increased at a faster rate than did total nonstop seat capacity in the nine-year period, the shift
towards the usage of smaller aircraft is evident, which is consistent with the results of the
percentage change analysis.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Peter P. Belobaba
Title: Associate Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Thesis Overview
In the past 18 years of airline history, the strategy in airline operation has changed
dramatically. Business strategy alternatives mostly pertain to the airline deregulation in
1978. The Airline Deregulation Act, passed by Congress, gave freedom to airlines to
serve any domestic route and set fares without government approval. It also allowed new
airlines to form and made it less difficult for existing airlines to expand operations into
new markets and abandon existing ones. It is obvious that deregulation has led to
increased competition in the airline business. Greater competition means lower airfares,
more services, and a wider variety of service offerings. More competition also forces
airlines to become more efficient both financially and operationally.
From the basic economic theory of supply and demand, the price of a good is inversely
proportional to the quantity demanded of the good: as the price of a good falls, the
quantity demanded of the good rises, and vice versa. For example, the price of a good is
the fare prices that airlines charge their customers and the quantity demanded of a good is
the number of passengers who purchase a ticket from an airline. Therefore, greater
competition (lower fares, more service, and a wider variety of service offerings), the
growth of global business, and better ergonomics in air transport are the key factors
which have stimulated the demand for air travel since deregulation. The current-year
demand in air transportation is much higher than the demand in 1978. One interesting
issue which is worth further study is how and to what extent airline supply, in terms of
airfare, average seat capacity and service frequency, has been changed since deregulation
in response to a higher demand in air transportation and an increase in competition
between airlines.
1.2 Thesis Objective
The objective of the thesis is to relate the trends in the average fare charged and average
seat capacity for nonstop services in the top 25 long-haul U.S. domestic markets to
changing airline business strategy and increasing demand in air transportation after the
Airline Deregulation in 1978. A long-haul domestic market is a domestic city-pair
market with a distance between origin and destination over 750 miles. According to
Aviation Daily (March 7, 1996), the top 25 domestic long-haul markets are the markets
listed in Table 1.1.
The airline's business strategy strictly refers to the flight frequency or, in other words, the
number of departures per day which airlines offer in their regular schedule. The demand
in air transportation refers to passengers who travel from one city to another for any
purpose (i.e., business or leisure).
According to the objective of the thesis, three important questions will be answered:
1. What are the trends in the average fare charged by airlines of these top 25 long-haul
U.S. domestic markets.
2. How changes in the average airfare charged by airlines may be correlated to increases
in air travel demand for the time periods after the deregulation.
3. How and to what extent the average seat capacity has changed in correspondence to
the increase of air travel demands and the changing patterns of route networks after
the deregulation.
4. How changes in average seat capacity may be correlated to changes in demand, flight
frequency, and fare for the time periods after the deregulation.
The result of this thesis will include a summary of the trends in airline demand and
supply (including average fare, service frequency, and seat capacity), and the correlation
between the changes in these components of airline supply with respect to the changes in
demand since deregulation in 1978.
1 Los Angeles New York 2,467
2 New York San Francisco 2,574
3 Miami New York 1,097
4 New York Orlando 947
5 New York San Juan 1,603
6 Atlanta New York 756
7 Los Angeles Honolulu 2,555
8 Fort Lauderdale New York 1,068
9 Chicago Los Angeles 1,751
10 Los Angeles Seattle 957
11 Chicago San Francisco 1,851
12 Dallas/Fort Worth New York 1,389
13 Las Vegas New York 2,235
14 Chicago Phoenix 1,446
15 Boston Chicago 854
16 New York West Palm Beach 1,030
17 Chicago Orlando 995
18 New York Tampa 1,009
19 San Francisco Honolulu 2,401
20 Anchorage Seattle 1,443
21 Los Angeles Washington 2,300
22 Chicago Denver 904
23 Chicago Dallas/Fort Worth 805
24 Boston San Francisco 2,694
25 San Francisco IWashington 2,428
Table 1.1: Top 25 City-Pair Markets Over 750 Miles, 3 rd Quarter 1995
1.3 Thesis Structure
This thesis is arranged into five additional chapters. Chapter 2 presents a literature
review which includes aspects of airline industry under deregulation, the trend and/or
forecast in the average system seat capacity of aircraft by U.S. commercial airlines, flight
frequency for nonstop services, and airfares. Chapter 2 also provides an overview of
studies that involve the use of econometric modeling in estimating relationships of
various parameters related to air transportation. The literature review helps the readers
understand how the airline business has changed in general since the deregulation.
Specific investigation and analysis of trends in demand and supply of the U.S. air
transportation system after deregulation will be presented in later chapters.
Chapter 3 addresses the methodology used in the analysis. Since the analysis focuses
only on the nonstop services of the top 25 city-pair markets in terms of passengers
enplaned in 1995, the rationale for using the airport-pair approach in the analysis will be
explained. Chapter 3 also specifies and explains the assumptions, mathematical methods,
models, and tools used to collect data and analyze the collected data, such as calculation
methods and econometric models. In addition, examples are presented to provide a better
understanding of these mathematical methods, models, and tools.
Chapter 4 concentrates on the annual and overall percentage changes in demand, airfare,
nonstop frequencies, total seat capacity, and average aircraft size in each of the 25
markets over the 9 years of deregulation (1987 - 1995). Note that the year 1987 is the
earliest year in which the data are available. The year 1995 represents the most current
year that has a complete data set.
Chapter 5 studies the relationships between passenger demand and air transport supply
including airfare, nonstop frequencies, total seat capacity, and average aircraft size. First,
the relationship between passenger demand and CPI adjusted airfare will be studied in the
same markets and for the same time period as the analysis in Chapter 4. The demand-
fare relationships will be calculated by two different approaches. The first approach
calculates the elasticity of demand with respect to average fare using the direct method.
The second approach uses econometric model (regression) to estimate this relationship.
Both calculation methods are described in Chapter 3. The results obtained from both
approaches will be compared and discussed. Second, the econometric models
(regression) will be developed in order to study total seat capacity and average aircraft
size relationships in the post-deregulation era. The models will help explain possible
correlations between the total seat capacity and average aircraft size with respect to
inherent variables including passenger demand, nonstop flight frequencies, and airfares.
The written structure of Chapters 4 and 5 are similar. Each chapter contains an
introduction, results of the analyses, and a brief conclusion. The introduction section
provides the readers with an overall picture of the motivations for and contents of the
chapter. The result section presents formal definitions (if necessary), the results of the
analysis, and result discussions. The last section presents conclusions that can be drawn
from the preceding analysis.
Finally, Chapter 6 provides the conclusion and summary of the analyses performed in
Chapters 4 and 5. This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section of
this chapter summarizes the results of the annual and overall percentage change analysis.
The second section summarizes the results of the correlations between the analyzed
parameters. The last section provides directions for further research studies.
Chapter 2: Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, several studies and journals that have investigated and forecasted airline
demand and supply in the long haul non-stop services since deregulation will be
discussed. The remainder of this chapter is divided into three sections. Because it is
important to how the airline industry has changed in general since deregulation before
emphasizing the changes in airline demand and supply, the second section of this chapter
briefly reviews general aspects of airline industry under deregulation. The third section
gives the overviews of trends and forecasts in demand, fares, and average seat capacity of
the U.S. air transportation system. The fourth section reviews the literature on the
relationship between the market variables such as airfares, seat capacity, service
frequencies and the growth of demand. This section also includes the results of
mathematical models that have been developed by different researchers in an attempt to
explain changes in the U.S. airline market supply with respect to the growing demand.
2.2 Airline Industry under Deregulation
In the early existence of air transportation in the United States, the airline industry was
comprehensively regulated by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) because of concerns
over safety and the financial health of the airline industry. The CAB was given the
exclusive authority to control the number of airlines that could provide air transportation
to the public. It also decided on which city-pair markets these airlines would be allowed
to enter or exit, and regulated fares charged by airlines. Although air travel demand and
airline revenue grew at a high rate from 1938 to 1977, several airlines were near
bankruptcy and service was not reliable because airlines operated under high fixed costs.
Additionally, downturns in the U.S. economy, especially the economic recession in the
beginning of the 1970s, led the airline industry to big losses. By the mid-1970s, it was
obvious that airline regulation was not very successful.
The move toward deregulating the airlines actually began in the late 1970s. It was
initially promoted by President Gerald Ford and then realized under Jimmy Carter with
the agreement of Alfred E. Kahn - Chairman of the CAB. In 1978, Congress finally
decided to end the CAB regulation by enacting the Airline Deregulation Act. i This Act
gave freedom to airlines to serve any desirable domestic route and set fares without
government approval. It also allowed new airlines to form and made it less difficult for
existing airlines to expand operations into new markets and abandon the old ones. It is
obvious that deregulation has led to increased competition in the airline business. Most
economists expected that greater competition in the airline industry would eventually
lead to lower fares, more services, and a wider variety of route offerings.
From 1978 through 1983, there was a dramatic increase in the number of new airlines,
the number of certificated airlines increasing from 44 to 114.2 These new airlines
operated as low-cost airlines, which did not offer frilly services, and concentrated their
routings mostly on short haul, high-density markets. Surprisingly, the new airlines were
able to compete effectively with the former airlines despite the fact that the market shares
of these airlines remained relatively small. However, the market share of new airlines
continued to increase slowly while the major airlines' shares declined over the next
couple of years. By 1985, the share of domestic traffic handled by the majors fell from
around 90 percent prior to deregulation to 72 percent.3 In terms of profitability, the
overall airline industry did not perform well financially in the early years of deregulation
because airlines were inexperienced in this new marketing environment and, more
importantly, economic recession in the early 1980s decreased the demand for air
transport.
Andrew R. Goetz and Paul S. Dempsey, "Airline Deregulation Ten Years After -Something Foul in
the Air," Journal ofAir Law and Commerce (Vol. 54), 927.
2 GAO, "The Airline Industry under Deregulation," Fares and Service at Major Airports (1990), 23.
3 GAO, 30.
Later, numbers of new marketing strategies were developed by the major airlines in order
to gain back their market share from the new entrants. Four major developments are
listed as following:
1. Hub-and-Spoke System
The main objective of the "Hub-and-Spoke" system is to accommodate larger volumes of
traffic from an increased number of city-pair markets. Airlines created hub facilities in
their air service networks to combine passengers from many origins into a hub and then
fly the passengers out to their destinations. This configuration of an airline's route
system allows airlines to capture more demand by effectively offering numerous daily
nonstop flights in many airport-pair markets, and better use their airplanes by operating
simultaneous departures and arrivals several times a day. Hub-and-Spoke systems also
make things easier for many travelers to secure flights departing and arriving at times that
best match their desired departure and arrival times. In addition, the airline with hub
facilities can gain recognition and preference from travelers living in the city, preventing
travelers from using another airline services.
2. Frequent Flyer Program
The purpose of a frequent flyer program is to influence customer choice of airline and
discourage potential competitors from challenging a major airline at its dominated
airport. This type of program was introduced in 1982 by American Airlines. It provided
travelers with a reward for continuing to make use of one specific airline's services.
Normally, the rule of this program is that the more flights or mileage a traveler flies with
the airline, the more he/she will be awarded. Therefore, the travelers, who earn some
credit but still need to fly more to get the reward, will likely stay with one airline for the
future trips. Some of the major airlines also impose expiration for the use of the reward
in order to force a traveler to fly more often. This frequent flyer program has been very
successful in the deregulated years. In 1990, for example, frequent flyers were defined as
individuals taking more than 12 airlines trips and 40 percent of airline revenues.4
3. Computerized Reservation System
The purpose of constructing the computerized reservation systems (CRS) is similar to the
other development discussed above, making things more difficult for new entrant airlines
to compete successfully with major airlines in the same market. The airlines that own
CRS gain an advantage over their competitors by listing their flights before other airlines'
flights on the computer screen display. This way the major airlines were able to achieve
positions of market dominance, while leaving almost no chance for the new entrant
airlines. Because this strategy is extreme in anti-competitiveness, CAB decided to
prohibit it in 1984. The recent CRS no longer biases the screen displays to the CRS-
owning airlines. However, it still has had anti-competitive impacts on the new airlines
because of two reasons: (1) the CRS-owning airline maintains a supportive business
relationship with its network of travel agent subscribers and (2) the other airlines have to
pay extra costs (booking fee) to the CRS-owning airline for each seat booked by a travel
agent. [51 [61
4. Yield Management
The purpose of yield management (YM) is twofold: (1) to improve revenue earnings of
the airline itself, and (2) to adjust fares in response to potential competition from new
entrant airlines. Airlines attempt to maximize their revenues by mixing different types of
passengers on each flight departure including those willing to pay full, discount, and deep
discount fares. Yield Management helps airlines forecast demand and calculate the
number of seats to be assigned for each fare type so that enough seats are available for
the late-booking passengers (or full-fare passengers). Yield management also involves
4 Humphreys, 42.
' GAO, 23.
6 Williams, 29.
changing prices over time of day, day of month, or season of the year. Therefore, it
frustrates competitors that attempt to attract travelers by reducing the fare to lower ones
than offered by a major airline. With the implementation of the basic YM system,
airlines' revenue increases by approximately two to five percent.7
All of these marketing strategic developments have provided major airlines with a great
competitive advantage over their smaller competitors. Apparently, these developments
are very successful. In recent years, there has been a major decline in the number of U.S.
airlines due to the bankruptcies of the new entrants and mergers between major and
minor airlines. The reduced competition may change the aspect of the airline industry to
oligopoly in the future. However, deregulation continues to provide significant benefits
to the public: lower airfares and more services. In addition, economists at Brookings
Institute estimated that the airline deregulation generates approximately $10 billion
annually in savings to the public.8
2.3 Passenger Demand and Airline Supply of the U.S Air
Transportation System after Deregulation
Since 1978, deregulation has created many positive effects for the U.S. airline market in
both demand and supply sides. The current year demand in air transportation has
escalated substantially from the demand in the early years after deregulation. Indeed, the
growth of global business and the technological advancement of transportation systems
are the significant factors that increase the need for faster and more convenient
transportation - airplane. Airline deregulation also played an important role in the
expansion of air transportation systems. The strong competition in the airline business
under deregulation forces airlines to be attractive not only in services but also in prices.
The strategy such as discounted fare and frequent flyer programs made air travel more
affordable for many moderate incomes. Air Transport Association reported that the
7 Peter Belobaba and John L. Wilson, "Cleaning up on Yields," Airline Business ( April 1997), 48.
8 GAO, 31.
revenue passenger miles by U.S. carriers rose by 109 percent within the ten years after
the airline deregulation. 9 According to Boeing researchers, the air travel demand in the
recent years is twice as many as the demand in the late years of the airline regulation era.
The forecast also projected annual worldwide traffic growth averaging 4.9 percent over
the next 20 years.10
When examining changes in airline supply, it is important to note that there are many
dimensions of airline supply. In this thesis, the airline supply includes airfares, seat
capacity, and service frequency. In terms of airfare, the average fare paid by consumers
has declined since deregulation, both compared to consumer prices in general and the
fares that an airline would likely have charged if regulation still continued. The average
fare fell 6 percent between 1978 and 1984. Today, the average fare is one-third less than
it was at the time of deregulation. According to the database of the Air Transportation
Association and the Department of Transportation, the average price charged per
passenger mile by U.S. airlines decreased by 35 percent after adjustment for inflation.7
The Federal Aviation Administration reported that the average system seating capacity of
aircraft used by U.S. air carriers increased by almost 20 seats (from 147.2 to 167.1 seats)
between 1978 and 1983, the early years of the deregulated airline industry. Between
1983 and 1992, the average seat capacity of the U.S. fleet remained almost unchanged, up
only 1.2 seats (from 167.1 to 168.3 seats). Surprisingly, the average seat capacity
decreased by 2.1 and 3.3 seats in 1993 and 1994, respectively." These two years show
the largest declines observed over the past 20 years since deregulation. The explanation
behind the decrease in average seat capacity is the fact that the short haul traffic with
carriers utilizing relatively smaller aircraft rapidly increased. This trend continued
through 1997. The Federal Aviation Administration also mentioned the impact of new
9 Paul Sheehan, "What Went Right," The Atlantic Monthly (August 1993), 86.
10 B. A. Smith, P. Sparaco, and M. Mecham, "Business Deals Evolve As Market Grows, "Aviation Week &
Space Technology (March 17, 1997), 59.
" "Aircraft Performance," Article for Course 16. 74 Air Transportation Economic. Massachusetts Institute
of Technology (Fall, 1996), 8.
legislation that requires stage-2 aircraft to be abandoned from the U.S. fleet by the year
2000. This legislation should result in the retirement of large numbers of the smaller
stage-2 fleet. Therefore, the aircraft being replaced should result in an increase in the
average seat capacity of the air carrier for the period 1997 through 2006.9
The Air Transport Association indicated that the proportion of the narrow body aircraft
was approximately 78 percent of the U.S fleet in 1994 (the wide-body aircraft composed
the remaining 22 percent of the U.S. fleet). However, the narrow body aircraft are
expected to account for 82 percent in 2006, which will decrease the number of wide-body
aircraft to 18 percent of the U.S. fleet. Bob Wolfe, president of the Large Commercial
Engines unit at Pratt & Whitney, supported that "the very large wide-body market is
shrinking". During the next 20 years, it is predicted that North America will remain the
largest market for new aircraft, with requirements for 3,300 narrow body aircraft, which
are twice as many as wide body models.12
The other supply in air transportation system refers to service frequency. The service
frequencies provided by U.S. airlines have increased substantially since deregulation.
The domestic airline industry is now more than twice as large as it was in the regulation
era, while the population growth is measured to be only 15 percent. There are currently
more than 40 hub-and-spoke operations in 32 cities in the United States. This means that
at least 30 U.S metropolitan areas have significantly greater non-stop services than they
did in the early years after deregulation. In addition, a substantial increase in service
frequencies has taken place in many markets, for example, the number of daily non-stop
flights from Boston to Dallas is only one in 1978, increasing to 10 flights in 1993.7
12 Bruce A. Smith, "Engine makers Develop New Service Strategies," Aviation Week & Space
Technology (March 17, 1997), 60.
2.4 Survey of Previous Studies
A survey of previous studies on the subject of trends in airline demand and supply since
deregulation revealed that there are a number of previous studies that have focused on the
analysis of price elasticity of air travel demand. The literature regarding price elasticity of
air travel demand is extensive for a wide variety of U.S. domestic markets including
nonstop city-pair, and hub-and-spoke markets. Because this thesis focuses on nonstop
city-pair markets, the elasticity of air transport supply with respect to air travel demand of
hub-and-spoke markets will not be included.
In 1976, Jung and Fujii studied the price of elasticity of demand for air travel using
"quasi-experimental" procedure. It involved the computation of arc elasticity of demand
(ep) from passenger loads along an individual route before and after a fare change. The
equation for arc elasticity of demand is formulated as:
ep = [ (AQ/Q) - Y (AQc/Qc)/n ] / (AP/P) (2.1)
Where;
AQ/Q = Relative change in the number of local passengers along a
route where prices changed.
AQc/Qc = Relative change in the number of local passengers along
comparable route where prices did not changed.
(AP/P) = Relative price change
n = Number of routes compared
The markets that were analyzed in Jung's and Fujii's study were less than 500 miles in
the southeast and south central sections of the U.S. and originated from New Orleans,
Atlanta, and Memphis. The median price elasticity of air travel demand were -2.350, -
2.704, and -2.905 for New Orleans, Atlanta, and Memphis, respectively.' 3
13 J.M. Jung and E.T. Fujii, "The Price Elasticity of Demand for Air Travel," Journal of Transport
Economics and Policy (September 1976), 3-5.
The literature of price elasticity of air travel demand can also be obtained from demand
modeling studies since most of the demand models were developed as a function of
airfares. It is important to note that most demand models were developed as a function of
other air transport supply (besides airfare) and socioeconomic variables. The important
air transport supply variables include travel time, flight frequency, and aircraft size. The
most often used socioeconomic variables include population of origin and destination
cities, and per capita income. Some models also include the competitive influence, such
as changes in airfares, flight time, and/or service frequency of another competitive
airlines, into the models.
The air-travel demand model developed by Verleger in 1972 estimated market price
elasticity at -1.03 for a market under 500 miles and -0.91 for market between 500 and
1,000 miles. The results showed that only the estimate of short haul markets was
statistically significant. 14 In 1974, De Vany, one of the first researchers who incorporated
some levels of service in modeling the demand for air travel, estimated market price
elasticity at -1.02 for a markets range less than 400 miles and -1.07 for a market between
400 and 650 miles. 15 In 1981, Ippolito, Anderson, and Kraus developed the demand
model that incorporated flight frequency and load factor as quality-of-service variables
affecting air travel demand.' 6 They estimated market price elasticity at -0.525 for a 440-
mile market and -1 for an 830-mile market.
The comprehensive demand model developed by Ghobrial and Kanafani in 1995 includes
various socioeconomic and air transport supply variables. 17 The model was developed
for the top 100 U.S. airport pairs. The analysis was limited to passengers flying directly
between selected origin and destination cities because the researchers wanted to ensure
14 P.K. Verlerger, " Method of the Demand for Transportation," Bell Journal of Economics Management
Science (1972), Vol. 3 No. 2.
15 A.S. De Vany, " The Revealed Value of Time in Air Travel," Review ofEconomics and Statistics
(February 1974), Vol. 56.
16 A. Ghobrial and Adib Kanafani, "Quality-of-Service Model of Intercity Air-Travel Demand, " Journal of
Transportation Engineering (March/April 1995), Vol. 121, No. 2, 136.
17 A. Ghobrial and Adib Kanafani, 137.
that the same aircraft is flown on a given flight itinerary between the origin and
destination cities. Their demand model was presented on the following form:
Tij = a.Pj .Iij .FRij.FPij.FOij".SPi .SOij.TMij. Exp(TRij + WHUBi). (2.2)
Where;
Tij = Daily passenger demand who fly directly in market ij
Pij = Product of populations of cities i and j
Iij = Product of income per capita of cities i and j
FRij = Weighted average airfare by class type in market ij
FPij = Number of daily direct flights between city-pair ij during peak
periods
FOj = Number of daily direct flights between city-pair ij during off-peak
periods
SPij = Weighted average aircraft size during peak periods between city
pair ij
SOij = Weighted average aircraft size during off-peak periods between
city-pair ij
TMij = Average travel time in hours between cities i and j
TRi = Dummy variable for tourist markets that is set to one if city i or j is
located in Florida, Hawaii, or Las Vegas and zero otherwise
HUBij = Dummy variable that takes on the value of one if airport i or j is a
capacity-constrained airport, and zero otherwise
S = Error term of estimation
a, P3, y5, , i, I, X, <p, a, o, and W = Coefficients to be estimated
In this analysis, three model specifications were estimated using different combinations
of variables. The first model included all variables in Equation (2.2). The result showed
that that the price elasticity of demand is -1.314, but it is statistically insignificant. The
second model excluded the travel time variable (TMij) from the specification of the
model. The result showed that that the price elasticity of demand is -1.211, and it is
statistically significant.
In terms of flight frequency, Ghobrial and Kanafani estimated that a 10 percent increase
in flights during the peak period would result in a 4.4 percent increase in demand for air
travel. They also concluded that the correlation between flight frequency and demand
was strong. These results are consistent with the conclusion of Ippolito, Anderson, and
Kraus. In terms of seat capacity (aircraft size), the results showed that air travel demand
is inelastic with respect to market seat capacity. Nevertheless, the demand is more
responsive to changes in market seat capacity during the peak periods than during off-
peak periods.
2.5 Conclusion
Most of the studies reviewed in this chapter have looked at the elasticity of air transport
supply (airfares, travel time, flight frequency, and aircraft size) and socioeconomic
variables (population and per capita income) with respect to air travel demand since
deregulation. None of these studies have taken a detailed look at correlation with air
transport supply. Therefore, this thesis aims to analyze trends in both demand and supply
in the long haul U.S. city-pair markets in order to provide some insight into the
relationship with air transport supply as well as the relationship between air travel
demand and air transport supply. The next chapter of this thesis will present the
methodology used in the analyses.
Chapter 3: Analysis Methodology
3.1 Introduction
This chapter is divided into four main sections. It includes the definition of the origin-
destination city-pair market in the first section, a list of the collected data and the
methodology of the data analysis in the second section, expectation of the analysis results
in the third section, and chapter conclusion in the fourth section.
3.2 Origin-Destination City-Pair Market
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the trends in airline demand and supply of the top
25 long-haul U.S domestic markets. In these 25 city-pair markets, there are 40 airport-
pair markets to be analyzed. It is important to understand the definitions of the origin-
destination city-pair and airport-pair markets and clarify the difference between these two
terms before performing the analysis.
A market is a collection of buyers and sellers whose interaction results in the possibility
for exchange.' In air transportation, a market is made of all the customers who want to
travel from a specific origin area to a destination area, and of all airlines that provide
transportation and services from that origin to destination area. To explain the concept of
origin-destination city-pair markets, a simplified air transportation network of three
different origin/destination cities: A, B, and C, will be considered (see Figure 2.1). The
demand for air transportation from origin A to destination B is not affected by any
improvement of in services or changes in airfare price from A to C, and vice versa.
Therefore, the market for air service from A to B is distinct from the market for air
service from A to C. In this three-node network, there are six distinctly different markets
for air travel: ABA, BAB, ACA, CAC, BCB, and CBC. Each market represents demand
Robert S. Pindyck and Daniel L. Rubinfield, Microeconomics (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1995), 11.
for roundtrip services from origin to destination and back to origin; for instance, market
ABA represents demand for roundtrip services from A to B and back to A. These
markets are called "city-pair" markets.2
Figure 2.1: Origin/Destination City-Pair Markets -A, B, and C
Most of the U.S. metropolitan cities, such as Chicago, New York, and Washington, D.C.,
contain more than one major airport in each of the city regions. These airports are
equally accessible from the origin or destination regions and provide competitive services
for the travelers. Therefore, a city-pair market can contain more than one airport-pair
market. For example, the New York - Los Angeles city-pair market contains 3 different
airport-pair markets including EWR-LAX, JFK-LAX, and LGA- LAX 3.
2 Peter Belobaba and Robert W. Simpson, Notes for Course 16. 74 Air Transportation Economics-
Chapter2, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (January 1995), 13-15.
3 JFK = John F. Kennedy International Airport
LGA = La Gaurdia International Airport
EWR = Newark International Airport
LAX = Los Angeles International Airport
In order to study trends in airline demand and supply of the top 25 long-haul U.S
domestic markets, we will look at an origin-destination city-pair market as an aggregation
of the airport-pair markets. However, some origin or destination regions may contain
several types of airports including major airports, small local airports (operating only
propeller aircraft) and heliports. In addition, each airport has its own service boundary
(or airport region) and provides transportation services to all travelers in the nearby
residents. One airport region can overlap with the other(s) in terms of convenience and
services. Some criteria in selecting airport-pair markets will be imposed in order to
employ consistent analyses and, eventually, obtain accurate conclusions.
3.3 Methodology
The analysis is divided into four steps. The first step involves collecting all the data
which will be used in the analysis. The second step calculates the percentage changes in
passenger demand, airfare, nonstop frequency, and total seat capacity, and average
aircraft size for the 25 markets from 1987 to 1995. The third step verifies the correlations
between passenger demand and airline supply as well as between airline supply variables.
The remainder of this section presents the calculation methods, setting, and framework of
the analysis.
3.3.1 Analysis Process
Step 1: Data Collection
The process of collecting data includes the selection of airport-pairs and aggregation of
yearly passenger demand, airfare, total seat capacity, and nonstop flight frequency, and
average aircraft size for each of city-pair markets from 1987 to 1995. The first three sets
of data (airport pair, passenger demand, and airfare) are obtained from the O&D Plus
database. Data for nonstop flight frequencies, total seat capacity, and average aircraft
size are obtained from the Electronic Official Airline Guide (OAG).
1.1 Selection of Airport Pairs
Because most cities that are analyzed in this thesis contain more than one airport per city,
the initial step in performing the analysis is to select airport pairs located in each of the
top 25 city-pair markets. In order to keep the analysis manageable and consistent, not
every airport in one city is included in the analysis. The airport-pair selection allows the
researcher to combine data only from major airports while neglecting minor ones such as
small local airports and heliports. Among these 25 city-pair markets, there are 20
different cities. These cities can be rearranged in alphabetical order as the following:
Anchorage, Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Dallas-Fort Worth, Denver, Fort Lauderdale,
Honolulu, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, Orlando, Phoenix, San Francisco,
San Juan, Seattle, Tampa, Washington D.C., and West Palm Beach. The criteria of the
airport-pair selection are:
* The selected airport has to be a major airport located in either an origin or destination
city.
* It can be the airport nearby the origin or destination city, if it is considered to be
equally accessible from the origin/destination regions and provide competitive
services for the travelers,
* It has to have been in operation for every year for which the analysis was performed
(1987-1995)
* There must be at least 1 nonstop service between the selected airport pair for each
year of the analysis (1987-1995).
* The average coupon passenger mile of each airport-pair (average of outbound and
inbound coupon; outbound and inbound from the origin airport to the destination
airport via all carriers) should be close to one, which theoretically implies that most
passengers travel on nonstop or single-stop flights.
The selected airport pair(s) for each city-pair market is summarized in Table 2:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Los Angeles
New York
Miami
New York
New York
Atlanta
Los Angeles
Fort Lauderdale
Chicago
Los Angeles
Chicago
Dallas/Fort Worth
Las Vegas
Chicago
Boston
New York
Chicago
New York
San Francisco
Anchorage
Los Angeles
Chicago
Chicago
Boston
San Francisco
New York
San Francisco
New York
Orlando
San Juan
New York
Honolulu
New York
Los Angeles
Seattle
San Francisco
New York
New York
Phoenix
Chicago
West Palm Beach
Orlando
Tampa
Honolulu
Seattle
Washington
Denver
Dallas/Fort Worth
San Francisco
Washington
Table 3.1: Airport-Pair Selection of the Top 25 City-Pair Markets
1.2 Passenger Demand
The demand of one airport pair is the total passengers who travel from the airport origin
to the airport destination in all four quarters of the given year. The total demand in each
quarter includes all passengers from both outbound and inbound traffic of the given
airport pair.
Formula:
Outbound Pax + Inbound Pax
rl"IMM
LAX - EWR, JFK
EWR, JFK - SFO
MIA - EWR, JFK, LGA
EWR, JFK, LGA - MCO
EWR, JFK, LGA - SJU
ATL - EWR, JFK, LGA
LAX - HNL
FLL - EWR, JFK, LGA
ORD - LAX, ONT
LAX - SEA
ORD - SFO, OAK
DFW - EWR, JFK, LGA
LAS - JFK
ORD - PHX
BOS - ORD
EWR, JFK, LGA - PBI
ORD - MCO
EWR, JFK, LGA - TPA
SFO - HNL
ANC - SEA
LAX - IAD, BWI
ORD - DEN
ORD - DFW
BOS - SFO
SFO - IAD
Quarterly Total Pax =
Example:
LAX EWR 79/1 11,950 10,200 22,150
LAX EWR 79/2 17,350 16,840 34,190
LAX EWR 79/3 16,110 17,300 33,410
LAX EWR 79/4 12,030 13,090 25,120
Table 3.2: Passenger Demand of LAX-EWR Market in Four Quarters of 1979
The total Demand of LAX-EWR airport pair for 1979 is:
22,150 + 34,190 + 33,410 + 25,120 = 114,870 passengers
1.3 Airfare
Airfare is the price of the airline ticket that a traveler has to pay for the air transportation
services from his/her origin to his/her destination. In a deregulated environment, fares
increase as time to flight departure approaches because airlines make late-booking
passengers pay higher fares than early-booking passengers. Late-booking passengers
usually refer to business passengers, while the early-booking passengers are vacationers.
Business passengers are willing to pay higher fares because they do not have to use their
own budget for the trip and, more importantly, an additional expense for the trip is small
compared to the money lost by not making the trip. On the other hand, vacationers are
price-sensitive because they use their own money to buy tickets for the trip. Because
fares fluctuate over time and differ between passenger types, the annual average fare
across airlines is a good representation of multiple fares for the proposed analysis.
Annual average fare is the weighted average of four quarterly fares with respect to the
total passenger demand (both outbound and inbound passengers) of each airport-pair
market. The weighted average fare is calculated by summing the product of outbound
fare and outbound demand with the product of inbound fare and inbound demand, and
then dividing the result by the summation of total demand.
To make the analysis meaningful, the weighted average fare should be measured in terms
of current dollars. This means analyzing fares in real terms rather than nominal terms.
Therefore, annual average fares should be adjusted for the inflation rate of their specific
year (see Appendix B). The consumer Price Index (CPI) is the most frequently used tool
for this purpose. The CPI is calculated by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. It records
how the cost of a large market basket of goods (in this case, the good is an airplane
ticket) purchased by a consumer in some base year changes over time. To be consistent
throughout the thesis, the word "airfare" used in later chapters of this thesis refers to the
CPI adjusted, annual average fare.
Formulas:
Quarterly Fare = [(Outbound Pax * Outbound Fare) + (Outbound Pax *
Outbound Fare)] / (Total Pax)
Airfare = (CPI of the current year / CPI of the given year) *
(Fare of the given year)
Example:
LAX EWR 7911 11,950 189.39 10,200 190.74 188.39
LAX EWR 79/2 17,350 174.72 16,840 172.87 173.81
LAX EWR 79/3 16,110 160.93 17,300 152.50 156.56
LAX EWR 79/4 12,030 219.07 13,090 218.61 218.83
Table 3.3: Weighted Average Fare of LAX-EWR Market in Four Quarters of 1979
The average fare of the LAX-EWR airport pair in 1979 is:
(188.39 + 173.81 + 156.56 + 218.83) / 4 = 184.40 dollars
Consumer price index of 1995 is 139.10.
Consumer price index of 1979 is 70.50.
The fare of the 1979 LAX-EWR airport pair in terms of 1995 dollars is:
(184.4 * 139.10) / 70.5 = 363.83 dollars
1.4 Nonstop Flight Frequency
Nonstop flight frequency is the total nonstop flights of all airlines between a specific
origin and destination. The nonstop flight frequency will be limited to the regular flight
schedule. Any nonstop flight that is used in the analysis must meet the following
constraints:
* Any accounted nonstop flight has to be in service for more than 15 days in the given
month. According to OAG, not every flight offers long-haul nonstop service
everyday; operation of the flight can vary from a single day to every day in a month.
Therefore, this constraint is made to collect the flights that have been effective for
more than 15 days.
* If the departure time and flight number of one airline is changed sometimes during
the month while the aircraft type remains unchanged, two flights will be counted as
one flight. According to OAG, some flights change the departure time during the
month. For example, the departure time of flight 195 of Continental Airlines
providing service from New York to Los Angeles in 1995 was changed from 5:30
p.m. to 5:15 p.m., while both flights used the same aircraft (757). In this case, only
one flight will be counted. This constraint is made to ensure that the same nonstop
flight in different time frames is not double-counted.
1.5 Total Seat Capacity
Seat capacity of one aircraft refers to the total seats of an aircraft used in the accounted
nonstop service. The total seat capacity used in the analysis is the total weekly nonstop
seats in a particular market. However, the aircraft type of one regular nonstop flight can
be altered during the given week due to real time changes in demand in that market.
Therefore, if the aircraft type of a nonstop flight is changed during the week, the aircraft
type that operates more than four days will be selected. According to OAG, some flights
change the aircraft type during the week. For example, Flight 91 of United Airlines,
providing service from Boston to Los Angeles in 1988 (departure time is 8:50 am and the
arrival time is 11:50 am), switched from using a D10 to a 767 after June 2 nd. For this
matter, the only aircraft type taken into account is 767 since the 767 was effective for five
days of this flight service. This constraint is made to ensure that the accounted aircraft
type is the majority of aircraft types used for that nonstop flight.
Step 2: Percentage Change Analysis
In this step, percentage changes of passenger demand, airfare, nonstop flight frequency,
total seat capacity, and average aircraft size are calculated on a year-to-year basis and in
the overall time period for the individual 25 city-pair markets. The year-to-year change
is the percent difference between the value of a parameter in the current year and the
previous year. The annual percentage change of each parameter is the average of 15
year-to-year changes. The overall percentage change is the percent difference between
the value of a parameter in the first year (1987) and last year (1995) of the analysis. The
results will be presented both in table and graphical form in Chapter 4 of this thesis.
From these results, the answer to the question: how demand, fare, nonstop frequency, and
seat capacity in the top 25 city-pair markets have changed since deregulation, will be
provided.
Step 3: Correlation Analysis
3.1 Passenger Demand-Airfare Correlation
The analysis involves estimating the price elasticity with respect to passenger demand in
the post-deregulation era for the individual 25 city-pair markets. The detailed analysis
will be presented in Chapter 5 (Section 5.2) of this thesis. Two different approaches are
applied for accomplishing this objective. The first approach calculates the average price
elasticity of demand (Ep) using "midpoint" method. First, the year-to-year price elasticity
of demand (Ep will be calculated. The formula of the midpoint method is
(3.1)= [(D2-D 1)/(P2-PI)] * [(Di+D2)/(P l+P2)]
Where:
D1
D2 =
P1  =
P2
Then, the average
demand.
air travel demand of the previous year
air travel demand of the current year
average fare of the previous year
average fare of the current year
elasticity of demand (Ep) is the average of 15 year-to-year elasticity of
The second approach uses the econometric model (regression) to explain the demand-fare
correlation. The regression model is a method of fitting relationships between demand
and fare. The analysis focuses only on non-linear regression forms since the changes in
demand are not linear in general. The non-linear relationships fitting to the data can be
expressed in the following form:
Demand = k * (Adjusted Fare) a (3.2)
Constant k and exponent a are the estimated parameters that provide the best fit to the
data. Constant k represents the intercept of the demand when the fare is equal to zero.
Exponent a measures the elasticity of demand with respect to fare. Further details of the
regression analysis will be provided in the "Regression Analysis Remarks" section. The
results obtained from both approaches will be compared and discussed in Section 3.3.2.
3.2 Airline-Supply Models
The analyses presented in the remaining of Chapter 5 (Sections 5.3 to 5.6) involve the
uses of the regression model. The goal is to measure to what extent the total capacity and
aircraft size used in the top 25 city-pairs markets have changed with respect to changes in
passenger demand and nonstop frequency since deregulation. The dependent variables in
all modeling scenarios are the passenger demand, total seat capacity, and average aircraft
Ep '
variables. The independent (explanatory) variables include passenger demand and
nonstop frequency. Therefore, the analysis includes:
1. Correlation between average per-day seat capacity and demand
2. Correlation between average per-day seat capacity and nonstop flight frequency
3. Correlation between average per-day seat capacity and demand, and nonstop
flight frequency
4. Correlation between average per-day seat capacity and demand, and nonstop
flight frequency, and fare
The functions of per-day seat capacity relationships are formulated in the following
forms:
1. Total Seat Capacity = k * (Demand) a
2. Total Seat Capacity = k * (Nonstop Frequency) a
3. Average Aircraft Size = k * (Demand) a
4. Average Aircraft Size = k * (Nonstop Frequency) a
Similar to the analysis of passenger demand-airfare correlation, Constant k represents the
intercept of the demand when all independent variables are equal to zero. Exponent (a)
measures the elasticity of per-day seat capacity with respect to passenger demand and
nonstop flight frequency, respectively.
3.3.2 Regression Analysis Remarks
This section explains the basis of multiple non-linear regression. An example will be
given to illustrate the methodology of the regression. As mentioned earlier in the
methodology section (step 3), the regression model is a method of fitting mathematical
relationships to the data. The non-linear relationships fitting to the given data can be
expressed in the following form:
Y = k * (X 1) a *(X 2) b (3.3)
The number of independent variables in an equation does not have to be fixed. In
Equation (1), dependent variable Y relates to two independent variables: X 1 and X2. It is
important to note that the regression equation has to be linear in the parameters, but it
need not be linear in the variables. Therefore, Equation (1) must be rewritten as the
linear form with the logarithmic quantity of variables before the regression is made:
Log(Y) = Log(k) + a*Log(XI) + b*Log(X 2) (3.4)
The three most important regression results are the coefficient estimates (1), the t-statistic
value for each independent variable (2), and the adjusted R2 value (3). For each
independent variable in the model, the magnitude of a coefficient estimate is the elasticity
of that independent variable with respect to the particular measures of the dependent
variable. The sign of a coefficient estimate is also important because it indicates the
direction of the independent variables. A positive sign implies that a higher number of
the independent variable corresponds to a higher number of the dependent variable,
while, a negative sign implies that a higher number of the independent variable
corresponds to a lower number of the dependent variable. Elasticity estimates are
important because they show the sensitivity of the dependent variable to the same
proportional changes in each of the independent variables. Therefore, the elasticity
estimates avoid the problems of comparing the effects of variables measured in different
units.
The t-statistic and the adjusted R2 values measure how well a model's independent
variables fit the data. The t-statistic value of a variable (i.e., X 1, X2, and X3) is a
coefficient estimate of the independent variable divided by its standard error. The t-
statistic value represents the statistical significance of the independent variable in the
model. A significant variable should have a t-statistic value exceeding 1.96 in absolute
value. Since the estimated parameters are normally distributed, a t-statistic with an
absolute value that is greater than 1.96 represents a 95 percent probability that the true
parameter lies within an interval around the parameter estimate.
The adjusted R2 value measures the proportion of variance in the dependent variable
explained by variance in the independent variables. A model with more statistically
significant independent variables will have a higher adjusted R2 value because a greater
proportion of the causes of variance in the dependent variable will be a result of variance
in the independent variables. Therefore, a good model or a model with many significant
independent variables should have an R2 value close to one.
Example
Airport Pair: Los Angeles International (LAX) - Newark International (EWR)
Demand S k * (Fare) a(Coupon) b (3.5)
The equation illustrated above refers to the demand model which includes fare and
coupon as the independent variables of the function. The data for the regression is as the
follows:
1979 114,870 363.83 1.27 5.0602 2.5609 0.1051
1980 130,270 318.43 1.23 5.1148 2.5030 0.0912
1981 366,380 266.63 1.14 5.5639 2.4259 0.0550
1982 496,800 240.61 1.22 5.6962 2.3813 0.0850
1983 474,310 277.89 1.25 5.6761 2.4439 0.0956
1984 1,028,250 255.14 1.16 6.0121 2.4068 0.0631
1985 1,028,120 219.88 1.14 6.0120 2.3422 0.0579
Table 3.4: Data and Log(Data) for Regression (Example)
The regression yields:
Intercept 16.46015 3.53364 4.65812
Fare -4.41049 1.58288 -2.78638
Coupon -1.49241 5.83488 -0.25577
Table 3.5: Result Summary of Non-Linear Regression (Example)
Therefore: Demand = 16.46 * (Fare) -4.41 * (Coupon) -1.49
In conclusion, the elasticity of fare and coupon with respect to demand are equal to -4.41
and -1.49, respectively. It means that for each one- percent increase in fare and in
coupon, demand decreases by 4.41% and 1.49%, respectively. The t-statistic test
confirms that the fare variable is statistically significant because the t-statistic of the fare
variable in absolute value is equal to 2.79 which is greater than 1.96. However, the
coupon variable is insignificant to the model since its t-statistic (0.26) in absolute value is
smaller than 1.96.
3.4 A Priori Expectations
This section justifies the inclusion of independent variables in the proposed correlation
models. It explains why independent variables are important to a model and how they
would correlate with the change in the model's dependent variable over the years of the
analysis. If an independent variable is valid in the proposed model, one should be able
to anticipate the direction (sign) of the independent variable coefficient. A positive
coefficient implies that increases in an independent variable will cause increases in the
Multiple R 0.9106
R Square 0.8292
Adjusted R Square 0.7438
Standard Error 0.1941
Observations 7.0000
dependent variable. A negative coefficient implies that increases in an independent
variable will cause decreases in the dependent variable. In terms of magnitude, it is
difficult to quantify a priori expectations. However, it is an interpretation of all possible
ranges of magnitude of independent variables. The ranges of the magnitude of
independent variables are either greater than one, equal to one, or less than one in
absolute value. The greater-than-one range means that an independent variable increases
(or decreases if it is negative) at a lower rate than a dependent variable does. The equal-
to-one range indicates that an independent variable increases (or decreases) linearly with
respect to increases (or decreases) in the dependent variable. The less-than-one range
means that an independent variable increases (or decreases) at a faster rate than a
dependent variable does.
3.4.1 Passenger Demand-Airfare Correlation
In general, demand and price move in opposite directions. As the price of a good rises,
the quantity demanded of the good decreases, and vice versa. Thus, the airfare elasticity
of passenger demand should be negative. However, it is possible to obtain a positive
elasticity estimate from the regression. The best explanation is that some significant
parameters, such as service quality of an airline and average population income, may be
excluded from this demand-fare correlation function. These parameters not only help
stimulate air travel demand but also increase airfares; for example, improvements in
airline's service quality may attract more customers to use the services of that airline,
while the airline has to increase fares to cover the extra costs paid for the improvements.
It is important to note that the main objective of the analysis is to verify the correlation
between fare and demand, not to calibrate demand models. Therefore, the demand
function of the analysis will not consider other independent variables (except airfare),
which may be significant to the demand function.
3.4.2 Total Seat Capacity Models
The second model is the correlation between total seat capacity (dependent variable) and
passenger demand (independent variable). Intuitively, one expects increases in passenger
demand to increase with the number of total seat capacity because a higher demand will
force airlines to use bigger aircraft, resulting in greater seat capacity being flown in the
system. The third model is the correlation between total seat capacity (dependent
variable) and nonstop flight frequency (independent variable). Because increases in the
number of nonstop flights means that more seats are flown in the system, one also
expects increases in nonstop flight frequency to increase the total seat capacity.
Therefore, the demand and nonstop flight frequency elasticities of total seat capacity
should be positive.
For the demand elasticity of total seat capacity, the less-than-one elasticity range implies
that average load factor per flight increases over the deregulated years because passenger
demand increases at a faster rate than does total seat capacity. The greater-than-one
elasticity range implies that bigger aircraft are used over the deregulated years because
demand increases at a lower rate than does total seat capacity. If the demand elasticity of
total seat capacity is equal to one, increases in passenger demand with respect to
increases in total seat capacity are linear.
For the nonstop flight frequency elasticity of total seat capacity, the less-than-one
elasticity range implies that smaller aircraft are used in the airline industry, but more
nonstop flights are provided for increases in passenger demand during the deregulated
years. On the other hand, the greater-than-one elasticity range implies that bigger aircraft
are used in the airline industry, but fewer nonstop flights are provided for increases in air
travel demand during the deregulated years. If the nonstop flight frequency elasticity of
total seat capacity is equal to one, then the flight frequency increases linearly with respect
to total seat capacity.
Airfare should not be related to the total seat capacity model. Although there may be
economies in scale between seat capacity and an airline's operating cost, the relationship
between seat capacity and fares are weak because fares made available by airlines do not
depend on airline costs alone. Changes in airfares should relate more directly to the
changes in air travel demand and/or the time of booking (differential pricing concept).
3.4.3 Average Aircraft Size Models
The fourth model is the correlation between average aircraft size (dependent variable)
and passenger demand (independent variable). Intuitively, one expects increases in
passenger demand to increase with the aircraft size because it is unlikely to use a smaller
aircraft for a higher demand unless more flight frequency is offered. The demand
elasticity of total seat capacity should be positive. The fifth model is the correlation
between average aircraft size (dependent variable) and nonstop frequency (independent
variable). Because increases in the number of nonstop flights means that fewer
passengers are boarded per flight, one expects increases in nonstop flight frequency to
decrease the average aircraft size. Therefore, the nonstop flight frequency elasticity of
average aircraft size should be negative.
For the demand elasticity of average, the less-than-one elasticity range implies not only
that smaller aircraft are used, but also that the average load factor per flight increases
over the deregulated years because passenger demand increases at a faster rate than does
average aircraft size. The greater-than-one elasticity range implies that bigger aircraft are
used and the average load factor per flight is likely constant over the deregulated years
because demand increases at a lower rate than does total seat capacity. If the demand
elasticity of total seat capacity is equal to one, increases in passenger demand with
respect to increases in total seat capacity are linear.
The range of the nonstop flight frequency elasticity of total seat capacity is expected to be
between zero and one because the nonstop flight frequency changed in a wider range of
value than did the aircraft size over the deregulated years.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter described the methodology used in the thesis. The purpose is to provide a
better understanding of the analysis processes including data collection and model
development, and the relevant computational tools. The analyses will focus only on the
top 25 U.S. city-pair markets in terms of passengers transported in both directions in
1995. For each city-pair market, the trends in airline demand and supply selection are
analyzed for the years 1987 to 1995.
Chapter 4:
Annual and Overall Percentage Changes in
Passenger Demand and Airline Supply
4.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the annual and overall percentage changes of passenger demand
and airline supply including CPI adjusted airfare, nonstop flight frequency, total seat
capacity, and average aircraft size for the top 25 longhaul U.S. domestic markets between
1987 and 1995. The analysis is divided into two main sections. The first section
represents the annual and overall percentage changes of aggregate passenger demand and
airline supply of all 25 markets. In the second section, the analysis and discussion are
broken down into an individual city-pair market level. The results are presented and
summarized in a numerical form. However, a graphical form can be helpful and is also
presented if the numerical results alone do not cover any extraordinary change of the
analyzed parameters in each market. In addition, the data used in each analysis will be
provided at the end of each section.
4.2 Trends in Aggregate Passenger Demand and Airline
Supply from 1987 to 1995
4.2.1 Review of Parameter Definition
Aggregate passenger demand is calculated by combining the yearly passenger demand of
all top 25 city-pair markets together. Airfare used in the analysis is the CPI adjusted
airfare. The average airfare presented in Section 4.2.2 is the weighted average of the
average annual airfare with respect to the passenger demand in each city-pair market.
Note that the average annual airfare of each city-pair market is the weighted average of
the airfare with respect to the passenger demand in each airport-pair market. The nonstop
flight frequency and capacity used in this analysis are weekly measurements and obtained
from an electronic version of Official Airline Guide (OAG). Aggregate nonstop flight
frequency and seat capacity are calculated by the same method as the calculation of the
aggregate passenger demand. Average aircraft size is calculated by dividing the weekly
seat capacity by the weekly nonstop flight frequency.
The annual percentage change of a parameter is the percent difference of the parameter
between given and previous years. The average annual percentage change is the average
of eight annual percentage changes, from 1988 to 1995. The overall percentage change
of the parameter is the percent difference between the first and the last year of the
analysis, 1987 and 1995, respectively.
4.2.2 Results ofAggregate Analysis - Total 25 Markets
Passenger GPI Adjusted Nonstop Fightj Total Aveage
- Year Demand kA e frequency fSize
1987 - -
1988 9.59% 1.45% 9.13% 7.15% 0.59%
1989 -2.65% 14.87% -2.86% -5.90% -2.89%
1990 12.20% -5.62% 12.59% 12.08% 2.69%
1991 -6.47% 0.38% -3.78% -3.29% -2.47%
1992 3.43% -4.25% 1.36% -2.96% -3.08%
1993 0.90% 3.96% 5.28% 5.27% 1.81%
1994 9.59% -11.49% 1.47% 1.47% -0.93%
1995 1.46% 0.41% 5.05% 1.00% -2.71%
Average Annual 3.51% -0.03% 3.53% 1.85% -0.88%
Overall Changes 29.93% -2.32% 30.63% 14.42% -6.97%
Table 4.1: Annual Growth Rate and Overall Percentage Change ofAggregate Passenger
Demand and Airline Supply from 1987 to 1995
Aggregate Passenger I
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Year
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Figure 4.1: Graph of Trends in Aggregate Passenger Demand from 1987 to 1995
The aggregate passenger demand increased at an average annual rate of 3.51% and by
29.93% from 1987 to 1995 (from 20.6 million passengers in 1987 to 26.8 million
passengers in 1995). Figure 4.1 shows that the aggregate passenger demand was not very
stable in the first five years of the analysis. First, the demand in 1988 increased by
approximately two million passengers which is equivalent to a 9.6% increase from its
previous year, and slightly decreased towards 1989. Then, it increased significantly by
12.2% in 1990 and decreased again by 6.47% in 1991. After 1991, the passenger demand
of all 25 markets continued to increase steadily. Note that the significant increases in
passenger demand took place in 1994.
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Figure 4.2: Graph of Trends in Average CPI Adjusted Airfare from 1987 to 1995
According to Figure 4.2, the average CPI adjusted airfare of all 25 markets decreased at
an average annual rate of 0.03%. The overall percentage changes of airfare decreased by
2.32% (from $186.79 in 1987 to $182.47 in 1995). The changes in airfare were relatively
small over nine years of the analysis. Although the average annual change rate and the
overall percent changes of airfare indicates that airfare is decreasing under deregulation,
average airfare increased remarkably from 1988 to 1989, increasing from $189.49 to
$217.67. The $217.67 airfare in 1989 was the most expensive fare over the nine-year
period. This increase can be explained by the economic concept of demand curve; prices
of goods decrease as demand increases and vice versa. Because airfare in 1989 increased
by 14.87% from 1988, the passenger demand in 1989 decreased by 2.65% from 1988.
Then, airfare changed alternatively up and down between 1989 and 1993. However, it
changed by only a few dollars. In 1994, airfare dropped significantly from $205.30 to
$181.71 which is equivalent to an 11.49% decrease from the previous year. Finally,
airfare remained almost the same between 1994 and 1995.
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Figure 4.3: Graph of Trends in Aggregate Nonstop Flight Frequency from 1987 to 1995
The aggregate nonstop flight frequency per week of all 25 markets increased at an
average annual rate of 3.53% and by 30.63% from 1987 to 1995. According to these
results, the aggregate flight frequency per week increased at almost the same proportion
to the increases of the aggregate passenger demand over the nine-year period. Also, the
trends of the aggregate nonstop flight frequency and of the aggregate passenger demand
of all 25 markets are very similar in terms of increasing in 1988, decreasing in 1989,
increasing again by significant amount in 1990, and continuing to increase since. This
phenomenon is logical because the more the passenger demand is, the more airline supply
in terms of number of seats is made available by airlines (either from increasing flight
frequency or increasing size of aircraft, or both). Conversely, increases in nonstop
frequency also lead to increases in passenger demand because the availability of more
flights reduces total travel time and stimulates passenger demand.
FrequencyA
Figure 4.4: Graph of Trends in Aggregate Weekly Seat Capacity from 1987 to 1995
The aggregate weekly seat capacity of all 25 markets increased at an average annual rate
of 1.85% and by 14.42% from 1987 to 1995 (from 0.60 million in 1987 to 0.69 million
passengers in 1995). Although the average annual growth rate and overall percent
changes of aggregate capacity are much smaller than both the aggregate passenger
demands and nonstop flight frequencies, the trends are the same. This, in turns, means
that airlines provided more flight frequency than larger aircraft size in response to a
higher passenger demand.
Average Aircraft Size
Figure 4.5: Graph of Trends in Average Aircraft Size from 1987 to 1995
The average aircraft size decreased at an average annual rate of 0.88%. The overall
percent changes show that the average aircraft size in 1995 is smaller than the average
aircraft size in 1987 by approximately 7%. Figure 4.6 shows that the average aircraft size
declined substantially between 1990 and 1992, and 1993 to 1995. It means that the flight
frequency increased faster than the seat capacity provided by airlines. The biggest
average aircraft size belongs to 1988, while the smallest belongs to 1995. These results
confirmed the fact that airlines have allocated small aircraft with a high flight frequency
rather than large aircraft with a low flight frequency in response to a higher demand over
the nine-year period.
From the aggregate analysis, both annual and overall percentage changes show that
passenger demand, nonstop flight frequency, and total seat capacity of the top 25 markets
increased over nine years of the analysis. On the other hand, airfare and average aircraft
size decreased within the same time period. Accordingly, three important facts can be
interpreted about the characteristics of the modem deregulated airline industry. First,
airfares continue to decrease under deregulation. Second, the airline marketing strategy
under a highly competitive environment due to deregulation is to provide smaller aircraft
and more flight frequencies rather than larger aircraft and fewer flight frequencies. This
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way, airlines can improve their service quality in terms of flight-time variety as well as
earn more revenue because more demand is captured in various time frames. Finally,
because of lower airfares, more service, and some other relevant factors such as the
impact from an upturn of the U.S. economy in the past nine years, demand of air
transportation increased substantially.
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Table 4.2: Aggregate Passenger Demand and Airline Supply from 1987 to 1995
4.3 Trends in Passenger Demand and Airline Supply of 25
Individual Markets from 1987 to 1995
In Section 4.2, the trends in passenger demand and airline supply were examined as an
aggregation of the top 25 city-pair markets. Because the trends are not the same for
every city-pair market that was analyzed, the aggregate analysis does not really tell us
much about the changes in passenger demand and airline supply in different markets. By
looking at each of 25 city-pair markets separately, five different types of trends in
passenger demand and airline supply are recognized. The first type consists of the
markets in which passenger demand, nonstop flight frequency, and seat capacity
increased, while average aircraft size decreased. The second type consists of the markets
in which passenger demand and average aircraft size decreased, while nonstop flight
frequency and seat capacity increased. The third type consists of the markets in which
only passenger demand increased. The fourth type consists of the markets in which all
parameters increased. The fifth type consists of the markets which do not fit in any of the
above categories. Note that these trend types are categorized regardless as to how airfare
changed. The results include the annual and overall percentage changes of the analyzed
parameters.
Type : Markets with increasing demand, frequency, and seat capacity and decreasing
average aircraft size
LOS Angeles
New York
Miami
New York
Atlanta
Chicago
Boston
New York
Chicago
New York
Los Angeles
Chicago
Boston
New TOMK
San Francisco
New York
Orlando
New York
Los Angeles
Chicago
West Palm Beach
Orlando
Tampa
Washington
Dallas-Fort Worth
San Francisco
Z.4J-'/o
3.95%
2.86%
4.15%
3.22%
2.94%
2.79%
2.62%
6.00%
2.85%
7.93%
4.93%
4.86%
-7.Z47o
-0.37%
-1.60%
-0.57%
1.32%
1.43%
3.99%
2.05%
-1.02%
-0.89%
-0.10%
3.73%
0.48%
6.51%
13.69%
7.51%
4.47%
6.15%
8.47%
2.38%
8.21%
3.81%
6.34%
5.34%
16.61%
Z.(/47o
4.15%0
10.89%
3.52%
2.83%
2.98%
3.13%
2.20%
5.63%
2.89%
5.45%
3.58%
13.56%
-2.24%
-2.67%
-2.50%
-1.46%
-2.68%
-4.34%
-0.63%
-1.53%
-0.66%
-0.56%
-0.66%
-2.96%
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Table 4.3: Annual Percentage Changes of Passenger Demand and Airline Supply of
Type 1 Markets from 1987 to 1995
Los Angeles
New York
Miami
New York
Atlanta
Chicago
Boston
New York
Chicago
New York
Los Angeles
Chicago
Boston
New York
San Francisco
New York
Orlando
New York
Los Angeles
Chicago
West Palm Beach
Orlando
Tampa
Washington
Dallas-Fort Worth
San Francisco
22.69%
45.23%
27.52%
36.94%
42.34%
1.17%
23.66%
21.96%
61.74%
16.35%
76.17%
46.65%
38.37%
-6.88%
-4.67%
-17.86%
-11.05%
-11.06%
21.72%
28.31%
7.49%
-0.59%
-15.10%
-2.08%
13.93%
4.96%
63.46%
110.08%
57.14%
30.58%
49.27%
78.45%
-1.10%0/
69.05%
14.44%
52.73%
38.13%
157.14%
ZZ.Zur"o
35.28%
62.38%
22.23%
14.57%/
19.70%/1
23.56%
-6.47%
42.60%
7.91%
44.19%
27.55%
97.20%
-Z4..Jv7
-17.24%
-22.70%
-22.22%
-12.26%
-19.81%
-30.76%
-5.43%
-15.64%
-5.71%
-5.59%
-7.66%
-23.31%
Table 4.4: Overall Percentage Changes of Passenger Demand and Airline Supply of Type 1
Markets from 1987 to 1995
There are 13 out of 25 city-pair markets that belong to this type. The range of the annual
percentage growth of passenger demand from 1987 to 1995 is between 2.43% and of
7.93%. The overall percentage growth shows that passenger demand of these 13 city-pair
markets increased significantly over the past nine years, ranging from 1.17% to 76.17%.
The same is true for the number of nonstop flights and seat capacity. Notice that the
nonstop flight frequency and seat capacity for Miami-New York and Boston-San
Francisco markets in 1995 increased more than twice as much as in 1987 (the overall
percentage growth of 110% and 157%, respectively), while increases in passenger
demand of these two markets are relatively moderate. This implies that the
competitiveness of these two markets is stronger than the other markets because airlines
attempt to provide more flights in order to attract passengers. On the other hand, the
average aircraft size decreased, ranging from 0.56% to 4.34% and 5.43% to 30.76% for
annual and overall percentage change, respectively.
According to Tables 4.3 and 4.4, airfares of seven of these Type 1 city-pair markets
decreased in the past nine years. The percent changes in airfares are relatively small
compared to the percent changes of the other parameters, especially the changes of
passenger demand. For those decreasing-fare markets, the range of the annual percentage
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decreases is between 0.1% and 1.6%, while the range of the overall percentage decreases
is between 0.59% and 17.86%. For those increasing-fare markets, the range of the annual
percentage increases is between 0.48% and 3.99%, while the range of the overall
percentage increases are between 4.96% and 28.31%. This evidence indicates that
airfares do not always decrease when passenger demand increases as explained by an
economic theory of demand curve. The increasing-fare markets involve Atlanta,
Chicago, and Dallas-Fort Worth. The major airports for these cities are operated as hub
stations for Delta, United and American, and American, respectively. Under hub-and-
spoke systems, the dominant airline has greater power to increase fare levels in the local
hub markets. This is one explanation for the fare increases over time in these markets.
For the city-pair markets in which their origin/destination is New York, two interesting
characteristics are observed. First, there was a passenger shifting from either EWR or
LGA or both airports to JFK (see Tables 4.13 and 4.14). For example, passenger demand
of the LAX-EWR airport-pair market decreased by 3.21% annually and 12.34% between
1987 and 1995, while passenger demand of the LAX-JFK increased by 7.49% annually
and 51.57% between 1987 and 1995. Second, if passenger shifting between airports did
not take place, JFK has the highest growth rate of passenger demand. These phenomena
can be an impact of expansions and/or improvements of service quality at JFK.
Nonetheless, these are not true for New York-Orlando and New York-Tampa city-pair
markets. For the New York-Orlando market, passenger demand of all three major
airports in New York (EWR, JFK, and LGA) increased and the growth rate of passenger
demand of LGA is the highest. For the New York-Tampa market, the annual and overall
percentage changes of passenger demand shows that passenger demand of JFK
decreased, while increasing in EWR and LGA (see Tables 4.13 and 4.14). Additionally,
the nonstop flight frequency and seat capacity provided for the JFK-TPA market in 1995
decreased by half from 1987. Based only on these results, one can conclude that both
passenger demand and airline supply had shifted away from JFK, but whether to EWR or
LGA is unclear.
Passenger Demand fo New York-Tampa Airport-Pair Market
Graph of Trends in Passenger Demand of New York-Tampa
Airport-Pair Markets from 1987 to 1995
Weekly Seat Capacity fo New York-Tampa Airport-Pair Markets
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Figure 4.7.: Graph of Trends in Seat Capacity of New York-Tampa
Airport-Pair Markets from 1987 to 1995
Figures 4.7 and 4.8 show that passenger demand and seat capacity of JFK and LGA
started to decrease, while increasing in EWR since 1990. Therefore, it can be concluded
that passenger demand and airline supply of the New York-Tampa market shifted from
JFK and LGA to the EWR airport.
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Figure 4. 6.
Type 2: Markets with increasing frequency and seat capacity, and decreasing demand
and average aircraft size
1 I New Y rK TIan Juan I -U.47o 7 . 1.04971 1.11701 -U.471
12 Dallas-Fort Worth New York -1.45% 6.91% 7.56% 3.74% -3.24%
Table 4.5: Annual Percentage Changes of Passenger Demand and Airline Supply of
Type 2 Markets from 1987 to 1995
0o ieW TO M loan juan J.J. 7o - .O 17o 1,JU./,70 4.o707 -°.107012 Dallas-FortWorth INew York 0.77% 34.09% 73.89%I 31.84% -24.18%
Table 4.6: Overall Percentage Changes of Passenger Demand and Airline Supply of Type 2
Markets from 1987 to 1995
There are only two markets in this market category. Although the annual percentage
changes of passenger demand are negative for both markets, the overall percentage
changes indicate that passenger demand in 1996 is larger than in 1987. However, the
results (both annual and overall percentage changes) are very small, meaning that
passenger demand of these two markets is stable over the past nine years.
The trends in airfares are different between these two markets. According to Tables 4.5
and 4.6, airfare for the New York-San Juan market decreased by 1.31% annually and
11.82% between 1987 and 1995. These decreases in airfare stays in the same range as
the type 1 markets. In contrast, airfare of the Dallas-New York market increased
significantly over the past nine years because the airport (DFW) in Dallas is a hub station.
The effects of hub-and-spoke operation are shown even more clearly through the trends
in nonstop flight frequency, seat capacity and average aircraft size. Based on the overall
percentage growth presented in Table 4.6, nonstop flight frequency and seat capacity of
the Dallas-New York market increased by as much as 73.89% and 31.84% since 1987,
respectively. At the same time, the average aircraft size decreased by 24.18%. Nonstop
flight frequency and seat capacity of the New York-San Juan market did not change
much over the past nine years since passenger demand of this market is stable.
Nonetheless, the result shows that airlines used smaller aircraft for non-hub markets as
well as hub markets.
Tvpe 3: Markets with increasing demand only
7 Los Angeles HOnolulu 0.07o -. -3.1/, -oU.U7o -1.o07o - i.uW10o
10 Los Angeles Seattle 2.85% -3.80% -0.54% -0.46% 0.13%
19 San Francisco Honolulu 3.65% -2.12% -4.32% -4.49% -0.15%
Table 4.7: Annual Percentage Changes of Passenger Demand and Airline Supply of
Type 3 Markets from 1987 to 1995
Overffall Percentage Cha {%)
SIk.t-P.air D•inand, Fire Freue,,cy SCap: • ••ize
7 Los Angeles Honolulu 58.11% -14.15% -6.72% -14.55% -8.39%
10 Los Angeles Seattle 30.87% -43.49% -12.64% -12.52% 0.13%
19 jSan Francisco Honolulu 45.83% -13.01% -32.56% -33.65% -1.62%
Table 4.8: Overall Percentage Changes of Passenger Demand and Airline Supply of Type 3
Markets from 1987 to 1995
In these trends, passenger demand is the only parameter that increased over the past nine
years. The range of the annual percentage growth of passenger demand from 1987 to
1995 is between 2.85% and 6.18%, while the range of the overall percentage growth is
between 30.87% and 58.11%. The increases in passenger demand of these three markets
are close to an upper bound of the increases in passenger demand of the type 1 markets.
Airfares of these markets decreased significantly over the past nine years, much higher
than the decreasing rate of the type 1 and 2 markets. Surprisingly, although the increases
in passenger demand of these markets are relatively high over the past nine years, both
the nonstop flight frequency and seat capacity declined. In addition, the average aircraft
size was hardly changed, ranging from only -1.03% to 0.13% annually and a -8.39% to
0.13% difference between 1987 and 1995. Therefore, it can be concluded that airlines
increased load factor of flights that served these markets.
Tve 4: Markets with increasing demand, frequency, seat capacity, and average aircraft
size
11 Chicago San Francisco 3.51% 2.20% 2.12% 2.98% 1.39%
13 Las Vegas New York 31.12% -4.27% 0.00% 2.98% 2.98%
14 Chicago Phoenix 7.56% -0.47% 0.83% 0.56% 0.30%
20 Anchorage Seattle 12.17% -4.28% 3.96% 4.84% 1.01%
25 San Francisco Washington 21.28% 1.58% 3.13% 4.04% 0.93%
Table 4.9: Annual Percentage Changes of Passenger Demand and Airline Supply of
Type 4 Markets from 1987 to 1995
: 1..: Overall Percentage Chages%) >
11 Chicago San Francisco 22.23% 20.52% 12.93% 24.42% 10.18%
13 Las Vegas New York 298.21% -21.78% 0.00% 2.70% 2.70%
14 Chicago Phoenix 40.53% 13.04% 0.00% -1.22% -1.22%
20 Anchorage Seattle 180.28% -40.16% 29.93% 40.51% 8.14%
25 San Francisco Washington 229.10% 20.09% 25.00% 30.89% 4.71%
Table 4.10: Overall Percentage Changes of Passenger Demand and Airline Supply of Type 4
Markets from 1987 to 1995
Passenger demand of these markets increased substantially since 1987, highest among the
five trend types. The range of the annual percentage growth of passenger demand from
1987 to 1995 is between 3.51% and of 31.52%. The overall percentage growth shows a
significant difference of passenger demand between 1987 and 1995, especially in Las
Vegas-New York, Anchorage-Seattle, and San Francisco-Washington, D.C. markets.
Because passenger demand of these markets grew significantly over time, increasing seat
capacity solely by providing more flights, might not be enough. Aircraft size must also
increase. In fact, increases of the flight frequency and average aircraft size of these
markets were proportionally small compared to the huge increases of passenger demand.
Therefore, average load factor should increase as well.
I · - -
According to Table 4.9, airfares of these markets did not change much over the past nine
years. However, the differences of airfares between 1987 and 1995 are quite large.
Notice that airfare of Chicago-San Francisco, Chicago-Phoenix, and San Francisco-
Washington, D.C. markets increased over the past nine years because Chicago and
Washington, D.C. are hub stations (explanation was already given in Type 1 section).
There are two strange characteristics that are noteworthy. First, although Chicago is a
large hub station for United and American, the trends in nonstop flight frequency and seat
capacity of Chicago-Phoenix market contradict our a priori expectation. Theoretically,
flight frequency and seat capacity should increase for a hub market. In reality, these
parameters of the Chicago-Phoenix market hardly changed over the past nine years.
Second, although passenger demand of Las Vegas-New York changed dramatically,
demand in 1995 was triple the demand of 1987; not only the nonstop flight frequency
remained the same, but also the seat capacity and average aircraft size increased by only a
few percentage points throughout nine years. This led us to believe that the average load
factor of the flights of these two markets increased over the nine-year period.
Type 5: Special case
1 8 Fort Lauderdale New York I 1.23/o -1.23%%1 1.42% 1 -0.89% -2.31% /
22 Chicago IDenver 2.41% 6.88% -3.12% -1.57% 1.49%
Table 4.11: Annual Percentage Changes of Passenger Demand andAirline Supply of Type 5
Markets from 1987 to 1995
8 I-ort Lauaer ale INew YOK I "77.7J•o 1 -70.D/ -. b.0/1 -Z.J'1o -1IO.U/o
22 Chicago Denver 48.26% 2.98% -22.99% -14.81% 10.62%
Table 4.12: Overall Percentage Changes of Passenger Demand and Airline Supply of Type 5
Markets from 1987 to 1995
The characteristics of these two markets are unique. For the Fort Lauderdale-New York
market, all parameters decreased over nine years. This is logical in that a decline in
passengers engenders fewer services. Therefore, one would expect the rank of this market
to go down in the near future. For the Chicago-Denver market, the trends in airline
supply are different than every other market that is analyzed. In this market, airlines used
bigger aircraft and less nonstop flight frequency. Also, because of decreasing seat
capacity, load factor of flights in this market should increase.
1 Los Angeles New York LAX EWR -3.21% 1.38% 9.15% 2.66% -5.50%
LAX JFK 7.49% -3.21% 6.40% 3.28% -2.29%
2 New York San Francisco EWR SFO -0.12% 2.22% 9.71% 5.25% -4.00%
JFK SFO 8.56% -2.17% 5.49% 3.95% -1.34%
3 Miami New York MIA EWR 2.18% -0.73% 15.59% 8.19% -3.97%
MIA JFK 11.00% -3.26% 16.29% 16.54% 1.72%
MIA LGA -1.76% 0.05% 13.73% 9.37% -5.16%
4 New York Orlando EWR MCO 4.32% -0.45% 11.65% 5.90% 0.10%
JFK MCO 2.26% -0.83% 12.97% 7.97% -3.40%
LGA MCO 9.01% -0.22% 9.03% 6.23% -2.86%
5 New York San Juan EWR SJU 2.87% -0.89% 9.60% 8.29% -0.19%
JFK SJU -1.10% -1.49% -0.80% -0.39% 0.54%
6 Atlanta New York ATL EWR 6.94% 1.65% 9.14% 6.61% -2.75%
ATL JFK 15.59% 0.16% 23.84% 29.92% 2.83%
ATL LGA -0.51% 2.44% 0.53% -1.89% -0.37%
7 Los Angeles Honolulu LAX HNL 618% -3.08% -0.64V% -1.6•% -1.03%
8 Fort Lauderadale New York FLL EWR 0.17% -0.78% 3.65% 2.54% -1.49%
FLL JFK -1.17% -1.97% 15.08% 8.39% -1.77%
FLL LGA -0.23% -1.11% 4.05% 0.58% -1.66%
9 Chicago Los Angeles ORD LAX 2.86% 1.60% 8.12% 3.69% -3.36%
ORD ONT 3.91% -0.05% 0.87% 1.54% 0.49%
10 Los Angeles Seattle LAX SEA 2.85% -3.80% -0.54% -0.46% 0.13%
11 Chicago San Francisco ORD OAK -0.18% 1.94% 5.42% 4.87% 1.39%
ORD SFO 4.46% 2.09% 2.85% 4.04% -0.77%
12 Dallas-Fort Worth New York DFW EWR -1.50% 8.00% 9.63% 8.19% -1.50%
DFW JFK -1.31% 4.54% 12.22% 11.45% 0.22%
DFW LGA -0.30% 5.65% 8.79% 3.08% -4.68%
13 Las Vegas New York LAS JFK 31.12% -4.27P/% 0.00% :2.98% 298%
14 Chicago Phoenix ORD PHX 7.56% ;0.47%"/ 0.83%/0I 0.56% 0.30%
15 Boston Chicago BOS ORD 2.79% 3.99% 8.47%/= 3.13%: -4.34%
16 New York West Palm Beach EWR PBI 4.04% 2.48% 7.45% 5.86% -0.90%
JFK PBI 12.15% 2.71% -80.00% -77.63% -77.63%
LGA PBI 5.40% 1.47% 2.60% 1.63% -0.49%
17 Chicago Orlando ORD _MCO 600% -1.02% :&821% 5.630% -1.53%
18 New York Tampa EWR TPA 5.75% 0.19% 14.94% 12.68% -0.62%
JFK TPA -4.32% -1.53% 2.13% 0.73% -0.87%
LGA TPA 10.00% -1.63% 6.67% 5.32% -0.67%
19 San Francisco Honolulu SFO HNL 1 65•% -2.12% 4•2% 4.49% .0.15%
20 Anchorage Seattle ANC SEA 1217% -4.28% 3.96% 4.84% 1.01%
21 Los Angeles Washigton LAX BWI 6.98% -1.20%/ 7.14% 10.36% 3.22%
LAX IAD 9.05% -0.22% 2.44% 2.02% -0.39%
22 Chicago Denver ORD DEN 2Z41% 6.88% -3.12% -. 57 1.:49%
23 Chicago Dallas-Fort Worth ORD DFW 4.93% 3.73% 5.34% ;3;5•/% -06%
24 Boston San Francisco BOS SFO 4.86% :0.48% 16.61% 13.56% -2-96%:
25 San Francisco Washigton SFO lAD 21.28% 1.58% 3.13% 4.04% 0.93r%
Table 4.13: Annual Percent Growth Rate of Airline Demand and Supply by Airport Pairs from 1987-1995
Overall PercentageChange (%)
Rank MarPke rAirpo t-Pair Demand Fae Frequecy Seat Cap. ANC Size
1 Los Angeles New York LAX EWR -12.34% 10.79% 81.63% 14.39% -37.02%
LAX JFK 51.58% -17.90% 53.66% 25.54% -18.30%
2 New York San Francisco EWR SFO 14.37% 10.19% 100.00% 42.59% -28.71%
JFK SFO 77.13% -16.43% 50.00% 32.55% -11.64%
3 Miami New York MIA EWR 33.60% -12.35% 153.57% 59.23% -37.20%
MIA JFK 111.87% -27.23% 117.39% 134.41% 7.83%
MIA LGA -25.73% -4.20% 81.82% 11.99% -38.40%
4 New York Orlando EWR MCO 47.50% -12.99% 82.14% 52.44% -16.31%
JFK MCO 5.13% -11.41% 31.43% -10.26% -31.72%
LGA MCO 43.10% -8.30% 45.24% 12.74% -22.37%
5 New York San Juan EWR SJU 24.81% -10.27% 75.00% 58.88% -9.21%
JFK SJU -4.24% -12.59% -12.09% -8.99% 3.52%
6 Atlanta New York ATL EWR 117.04% -22.48% 75.26% 35.72% -22.56%
ATL JFK 96.32% -6.14% 90.48% 134.99% 23.37%
ATL LGA -21.35% 17.37% -14.52% -21.23% -7.86%
7 Los Angeles Honolulu LAX HNL 58.11% -14.15% -6.72% -14.55% 4.39%
8 Fort Lauderadale New York FLL EWR 2.91% -16.14% 21.28% -1.25% -18.58%
FLL JFK -17.84% -19.25% -3.57% -23.38% -20.54%
FLL LGA -19.03% -15.28% -33.87% -43.97% -15.27%
9 Chicago Los Angeles ORD LAX -0.88% 24.83% 61.96% 22.11% -24.61%
ORD ONT 15.71% .3.13% 0.00% 3.17% 3.17%
10 Los Angeles Seattle LAX SEA 30.87% -43.49% -12.64% -1252%* :13%
11 Chicago San Francisco ORD OAK 26.78% 20.80% 23.21% 36.24% 10.57%
ORD SFO -0.24% 18.92% -20.00% -29.61% -12.02%
12 Dallas-Fort Worth New York DFW EWR 24.06% 20.82% 85.71% 58.02% -14.91%
DFW JFK -34.27% 28.98% 0.00% -1.58% -1.58%
DFW LGA -8.56% 43.01% 85.06% 24.38% -32.79%
13 Las Vegas New York LAS JFK 298.21%: -21.78% 0.00/% 270% 2.70%
14 Chicago Phoenix ORD PHX 40.53% 13.04% 0.00/ -1.22% -1.22%
15 Boston Chicago BOS ORD 23.66% 28.31% 78.45% 23.56% -30.76%
16 New York West Palm Beach EWR PBI 57.21% 9.12% 40.00% 24.39% -11.15%
JFK PBI -58.12% 21.32% -100.00% -100.00% -100.00%
LGA PBI 17.58% 5.05% -2.38% -6.52% -4.24%
17 Chicago Orlando ORD MCO 61.74% -0.59% 69.05% 42.60%: 15.64%
18 New York Tampa EWR TPA 51.39% -12.30% 133.33% 111.91% -9.18%
JFK TPA -55.61% -17.85% -48.78% -52.32% -6.90%
LGA TPA 51.99% -19.83% 17.86% 11.11% -5.73%
19 San Francisco Honolulu SFO HNL 45.83% :13.01% .32.56% -33.651%X -1.62%
20 Anchorage Seattle ANC SEA 180.28% -40.16% 29.93% 40.51% 8.14%
21 Los Angeles Washigton LAX BWI 65.26% -4.81% 50.00% 56.18% 4.12%
LAX LAD 82.19% -1.95% 14.55% 8.71% -5.10%
22 Chicago Denver ORD DEN 48.26% 2.98% -22.99% -14.81% 10.62%1
23 Chicago Dallas-Fort Worth ORD DFW 46.65% 13.93% 38.13% 27.55%: -7.66%
24 Boston San Francisco BOS SFO 38.37% 4.96% 157.14% 9720% -23.31%
25 San Francisco Washigton SFO IAD 229.10%01 20.09% 25.00% 30.89%0 4.71%
Table 4.14: Overall Percent Growth Rate of Airline Demand and Supply by Airport Pairs from 1987-1995
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter has presented the trends of passenger demand and airline supply of the top
25 U.S. longhaul domestic markets across the nine year period of deregulation based on
the average annual and overall percentage changes. The analysis was divided into two
sections, aggregate base and individual market base. The aggregate analysis combined 25
markets, incorporating the parameters of the individual markets. The results showed that
passenger demand increased approximately 6.2 million passengers between 1987 and
1995, approximately 3.5% annually and 30% overall. On an air supply side, the results
can be summarized as follows:
1. Changes in airfares were very small. The average airfare was the highest in 1989 and
continued to decrease by only a few dollars since.
2. Nonstop flight frequency increased in about the same rate as passenger demand
across the nine-year period. The number of flights in 1995 is greater than the number
of flights in 1987 by approximately 1000 flights.
3. Total weekly seat capacity of the total 25 markets increased by 90,000 seats per week
since 1987, which is accounted for 1.85% annually and 14.42% overall. Total weekly
seat capacity grew at a slower rate than the aggregate passenger demand of all 25
markets
4. The average aircraft size decreased by approximately 15 seats per departures since
1987.
The individual-market analysis provided more insight into the changes of passenger
demand and airline supply of these top 25 markets. The majority of the top 25 markets
has the same trends as the results of the aggregate analysis: increasing demand, nonstop
flight frequency, and seat capacity, but decreasing average aircraft size. There are also
some markets in which the nonstop flight frequency, seat capacity, and average aircraft
decreased or increased by a very small proportion compared to increases in passenger
demand. In this case, it can be concluded that load factor of flight, on average, should be
increased. In addition, hub-and-spoke systems affect airline supply in many ways. First,
increases in nonstop flight frequency and seat capacity across the nine-year period were
higher than non-hub markets in general. Second, the average aircraft size of hub markets
decreased at a faster rate than non-hub markets. Finally, airfares of local hub markets
tended to increase, suggesting that there might exist a greater potential for monopolistic
pricing by the dominant hub carrier in such markets.
Chapter 5:
Correlation of Passenger Demand and Airline
Supply
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, although the same conclusion of trends in passenger demand and
airline supply in recent years could not be made for every analyzed market, the results
showed that passenger demand, seat capacity, and nonstop flight frequency increased,
while airfare and average aircraft size decreased in the nine year period for aggregate
measurements and most of the top 25 city-pair markets. In this chapter, we look further
into correlations between different pairs of the parameters in an attempt to understand
how and to what extent the changes in one parameter may affect the other parameters in
the deregulation era. This includes the studies of correlations between passenger demand
and demand-relevant airline supply and between airline supply measures themselves.
The analyses focus solely on a non-linear (exponential) form because response to price is
typically non-linear.
Since the analysis of this thesis has concentrated on five parameters including passenger
demand, airfare, seat capacity, nonstop frequency, and average aircraft size, there are ten
possible correlations to be explored.' However, it is not necessary to analyze all of them
because some are redundant and some are meaningless. The potentially meaningful
correlations that will be analyzed in this chapter include airfare-passenger demand, seat
capacity-passenger demand, seat capacity-nonstop frequency, average aircraft size-
passenger demand, and average aircraft size-nonstop frequency correlations. These
correlations will be presented and discussed in five separate sections, respectively. Each
SThe 10 possible correlation models include demand-fare, demand-capacity, demand-frequency, demand-
A/C size, fare-capacity, fare-frequency, fare-A/C size, capacity-frequency, capacity-A/C size, and
frequency-A/C size.
section contains two subsections, dealing with aggregate and individual city-pair models.
The data associated with the analysis are given in Appendix A.
5.2 Passenger Demand-Airfare Correlation
According to economic theory, passenger demand increases as the price of an air ticket
falls. The analysis in the previous chapter showed that airfares of the top 25 markets
continue to decrease under deregulation (except some markets that involve hub
operations). In this section, the elasticities of passenger demand with respect to airfare
are estimated for the top 25 markets. Accurate estimates of the price elasticity of demand
are difficult to obtain because the changes in passenger demand depend not only upon the
changes in airfare, but also upon other factors such as population, employment, per capita
income, frequency of scheduling, and service quality. The problem is that these data are
normally unavailable, very hard to measure, or, most importantly, subject to errors in the
estimation. For example, although, in general, one would expect that the demand for air
travel is greater in a highly populated city than in a sparsely populated city, it is not
always the case. Consider three different cities: Boston, Lisbon, and Sydney. Boston has
about four times as much passenger traffic as Lisbon and twice that of Sydney, but all
have about the same overall population.2
Therefore, two different approaches will be used to calculate the price elasticity of
demand for the top 25 markets. The first approach is the midpoint method (see Chapter
3, Section 3.2) which is the average of arc elasticity of demand of an individual market
before and after a fare change over the nine-year period. The second approach is the non-
linear regression method which finds the best fitting curve for the given data of passenger
demand and airfares. Both methods will not yield the same result because of the
differences in characteristics of the calculations described above. Therefore, the results
will be summarized in the range between, and the average of, the price elasticity of
demand obtained from these two methods. Additionally, R2 and t-statistic values of the
2 Source: Notes for 1.23 1J/16.781 Planning and Design of Airport Systems, MIT, Spring 1998.
second approach calculation will be reported in order to verify how well the model fits
the data.
5.2.1 Aggregate Model
1. Midpoint Method
1987 20,630,180
1988 22,609,360
1989 22,009,150
1990 24,695,010
1991 23,097,560
1992 23,889,910
1993 24,105,470
1994 26,418,370
1995 26,803,950
186.79
189.49
217.67
205.45
206.23
197.48
205.30
181.71
182.47
6.38
-0.19
-1.99
-17.53
-0.78
0.23
-0.75
3.51
Average -1.39
Table 5.1: Price Elasticity ofAggregate
2. Non-Linear Regression Method (NLR)
Passenger Demand by Midpoint .Method
r4.t
0.125 5,316,732 22.982 Sig -0.350 -2.724 Sig
Table 5.2: AggregatePrice Elasticity with Respect to Passenger Demand by
NLR Regression Method
The results can be interpreted that for each one percent decrease in airfare, passenger
demand of the top 25 markets increased by 1.39% and 0.35% for Midpoint and NLR
methods, respectively. The value for the fare elasticity obtained from the Midpoint
method is much smaller than from the NLR method. By looking at passenger demand
and airfares over nine years from Table 5.1, one can observe that the decreases in airfares
were very small compared to the increases in passenger demand over the nine-year
period. Therefore, the demand should be elastic. However, the price elasticity of
demand obtained from the NLR method (-0.35) is much greater than negative one,
indicating that passenger demand of the top 25 market is inelastic. Indeed, it contradicts
both the priori economic intuition and the result obtained from the Midpoint method.
Because the fare variable is significant in the model according to the t-statistic values, the
only evidence that helps to argue that the result obtained from the NLR method does not
make sense conceptually, is the R2 value. The best fitting model should have R2 close to
one. In the NLR model, the R2 value is extremely small (0.12), meaning that the fitting
level of the model is very poor. On the other hand, the price elasticity of demand
obtained from Midpoint method is lower than negative one. This number is acceptable in
terms of the priori expectation.
5.2.2 Individual Market Models
The previous sub-section presented the price elasticity of passenger demand of all 25
markets combined. It is important to note that it may contain errors because the trends of
passenger demand and airfares are not the same for all markets. This sub-section
examines the price elasticity of demand for the 25 markets in isolation. Therefore, the
results should be more accurate and provide more insight about the correlation between
airfares and passenger demand of these 25 markets.
LOS Angeles
New York
Miami
New York
New York
Atlanta
Los Angeles
Fort Lauderdale
Chicago
Los Angeles
Chicago
Dallas-Fort Worth
Las Vegas
Chicago
Boston
New York
Chicago
New York
San Francisco
Anchorage
Los Angeles
Chicago
Chicago
Boston
San Francisco
New T OrK
San Francisco
New York
Orlando
San Juan
New York
Honolulu
New York
Los Angeles
Seattle
San Francisco
New York
New York
Phoenix
Chicago
West Palm Beach
Orlando
Tampa
Honolulu
Seattle
Washington
Denver
Dallas-Fort Worth
San Francisco
Washington
Table 5.3: Price Elasticity Estimations of Passenger Demand of the 25 Individual Markets
Note that the values in an italic form are the results of the NLR method and only the
significant ones are considered (see Table 5.4). The fare elasticities of passenger demand
of these 25 markets varies from -0.54 to -3.22. The most fare-inelastic market is the
Chicago-Dallas market, while the most fare-elastic market is the New York-Orlando
market. According to Table 5.1, 20 of these city-pair markets have fare elasticity lower
than -1, meaning that the passenger demand is elastic. Among these 20 markets, the price
elasticities of three markets including the New York-San Francisco, New York-Orlando,
and Las Vegas- New York markets, are extremely high. The reason for such an extreme
fare elasticity is because passenger demand of these markets grew substantially, while
airfares corresponding to these markets did not change much over nine years (see Tables
4.3 and 4.9). By contrast, there are five markets in which their fare elasticities are greater
-1.20
-1.28
-1.82
-1.90
-1.48
-1.21
-1.48
-1.13
-0.80
-0.93
-1.09
-1.66
-0.97
-0.38
-1.02
-1.23
-1.44
-1.72
-1.64
-1.18
-0. 71
-0.001
-1.02
-1.32
-2.85
-1.91
-4.62
-2.01
-1.69
-2.03
-2.10
-1.23
-1.01
-1.24
-1.16
-3.36
-1.04
-0.61
-1.76
-1.75
-2.42
-1.77
-1.77
-2.29
-0.88
-0.54
-1.61
-1.78
Average
-1.20
-1.60
-3.22
-1.90
-1.59
-1.62
-2.10
-1.23
-0.91
-0.93
-1.16
-2.51
-1.04
-0.61
-1.76
-1.75
-1.93
-1.75
-1.71
-1.18
-0.88
-0.54
-1.02
-1.55
-1.48
than negative one, meaning that the passenger demand is inelastic. These markets
include the Los Angeles-Seattle, Chicago-Phoenix, Boston-Chicago, Chicago-Denver,
and Chicago-Dallas markets. Notice that the origins/destinations of these markets
involve hub operations and business markets. As discussed in Chapter 4, airfares in hub-
related markets increased because the dominant airline at that hub station is more likely
to have monopoly power to increase fare levels. On the other hand, business travelers are
insensitive to changes in airfare because they do not use their own money to pay for
airline tickets. Therefore, it is logical for the price elasticity for passenger demand of
these markets to be inelastic. In addition, the average fare elasticity of these 25 markets
is -1.48, very close to the result of the Midpoint method of the aggregate model.
Similar to the NLR result of aggregated model, Table 5.4 shows that the extrapolations
contain low R2 value and the fare variable is statistically insignificant for most of the 25
markets. This implies that changes in passenger demand do not depend solely upon
changes in airfares. Some other factors should also be considered as part of the model.
However, the objective of the analysis concentrated strictly on the sensitivity of
passenger demand with respect to the changes in airfares. A positive feature of the NLR
results of the individual market model is that the estimations confirm our a priori
expectation.
Los Angeles
New York
Miami
New York
New York
Atlanta
Los Angeles
Fort Lauderdale
Chicago
Los Angeles
Chicago
Dallas-Fort Worth
Las Vegas
Chicago
Boston
New York
Chicago
New York
San Francisco
Anchorage
Los Angeles
Chicago
Chicago
Boston
San Francisco
New YOrK
San Francisco
New York
Orlando
San Juan
New York
Honolulu
New York
Los Angeles
Seattle
San Francisco
New York
New York
Phoenix
Chicago
West Palm Beach
Orlando
Tampa
Honolulu
Seattle
Washington
Denver
Dallas-Fort Worth
San Francisco
Washington
Table 5.4: Additional Results of the Non-Linear Regression Method of the 25 Individual Markets
5.3 Total Nonstop Seat Capacity-Passenger Demand
Correlation
Because passenger demand has grown greatly over time, this section estimates the
sensitivity of the total nonstop seat capacity to the same proportional changes in
passenger demand. In general, the higher the passenger demand, the higher the seat
capacity would be provided in the market. The elasticity of the total seat capacity with
respect to demand should be positive. Note that the range of the elasticity is important
for interpretations of the correlation between these two parameters. If the calculated
elasticity ranges between zero and one, it means that passenger demand grew at a faster
-U.U
-0.07
0.77
0.61
0.03
0.71
0.62
-0.07
-0.02
0.77
-0.14
-0.03
0.77
-0.07
0.25
-0.02
-0.02
0.56
0.41
0.94
-0.14
0.01
0.03
-0.12
0.49
ruM
Poor
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Good
Poor
Good
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Poor
Poor
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Poor
Poor
Good
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Poor
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Poor
Poor
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Good
Poor
Poor
Poor
Poor
Poor
2.17E+07
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4.28E+08
4.33E+06
6.35E+07
8.69E+09
4.24E+06
2.46E+06
1.86E+07
8.38E+05
1.47E+06
1.47E+14
1.66E+06
1.91 E+05
9.51 E+06
4.92E+04
2.26E+07
8.09E+0S
3.28E+05
5.26E+05
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4.39
22.71
13.20
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25.86
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-1.24
Sig
Sig
Sig
Sig
Sig
Sig
Sig
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Sig
Sig
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Sic
Sic
Sic
Sic
Not Sic
-0.71
-5.27
-3.67
-1.10
-4.58
-3.78
-0.69
-0.91
-5.23
-0.07
-0.87
-5.22
-0.71
1.90
-0.90
0.90
-3.34
-2.57
-10.83
0.05
-1.04
-1.13
0.38
2.92
Not Sig
Sig
Sig
Not Sig
Sig
Sig
Not Sig
Not Sig
Sig
Not Sig
Not Sig
Sig
Not Sig
Not Sig
Not Sig
Not Sig
Sig
Sig
Sig
Not Sig
Not Sig
Not Sig
Not Sig
Sig
L-
rate than the total seat capacity did over time. One, therefore, can expect the number of
passengers per flight (load factor) to be higher. In contrast, if the calculated elasticity is
greater than one, it means that passenger demand grew at a slower rate than the total seat
capacity did over time. In this case, airlines have to increase either the size of aircraft,
flight frequency, or the combination of both parameters.
5.3.1 Aggregate Model
I .... I ---- I .... -I i
Table 5.5: Aggregate Total Nonstop Seat Capacity Elasticity with Respect to Passenger Demand
The results can be interpreted that for each one percent change in aggregate passenger
demand of the top 25 markets, the total seat capacity changes by 0.82 percent. Because
the elasticity estimate of the seat capacity with respect to passenger demand is positive
and less than one, it implies that passenger demand grew at a faster rate than seat capacity
did over the nine year period. Conceptually, a load factor of flights on average should be
higher. It is also important to note that the elasticity of 0.82 is close to one. In other
words, the correlation between the total seat capacity and passenger demand is close to
linear. Therefore, increases in load factor may not be as substantial. Although this
estimate confirms our a priori expectation and is significant statistically, the adjusted R2
statistic is low, suggesting that the demand variable in the aggregate model poorly
explained the variance in the total nonstop seat capacity of the top 25 markets.
5.3.2 Individual Market Models
Los Angeles
New York
Miami
New York
New York
Atlanta
Los Angeles
Fort Lauderdale
Chicago
Los Angeles
Chicago
Dallas-Fort Worth
Las Vegas
Chicago
Boston
New York
Chicago
New York
San Francisco
Anchorage
Los Angeles
Chicago
Chicago
Boston
San Francisco
New York
San Francisco
New York
Orlando
San Juan
New York
Honolulu
New York
Los Angeles
Seattle
San Francisco
New York
New York
Phoenix
Chicago
West Palm Beach
Orlando
Tampa
Honolulu
Seattle
Washington
Denver
Dallas-Fort Worth
San Francisco
Washington
Table 5.6: Elasticity Estimations of Total Nonstop Seat Capacity with Respect to
Passenger Demand
The total nonstop seat capacity elasticities with respect to passenger demand of these 25
markets vary from -0.73 to 2.37. The elasticity range is large because it includes
negative values, which contradict our priori expectation. There are five markets with a
negative elasticity, including the Los Angeles-Honolulu, Chicago-Los Angeles, Los
Angeles-Seattle, San Francisco-Honolulu, and Chicago-Denver markets. Two
observations are made regarding these unexpected results. First, none of the negative
estimates are statistically significant and therefore they are not useful. Second, the results
are negative because the trends of the total seat capacity and passenger demand of these
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five markets go in opposite directions, increasing passenger demand, but decreasing total
seat capacity over the nine year period (See Tables 4.7 and 4.11).
Two markets including Fort Lauderdale-New York and Boston-San Francisco have the
estimates that are greater than one and statistically significant. According to the results,
for each one percent change in passenger demand, the total seat capacity changed by
1.50% and 2.37%, respectively. The estimates are high compared to the other markets.
Therefore, changes in seat capacity of these two markets are more sensitive to changes in
passenger demand than the other 23 markets. This leads us to believe that airlines
provide larger aircraft, and/or more flight frequency in these two markets for competitive
reasons.
The remaining 18 markets have the total seat capacity with respect to passenger demand
between zero and one. Within this range, the result estimates vary greatly from near zero
to almost one. Interestingly, the exponent of passenger demand variable of Chicago-San
Francisco is almost equal to one, suggesting that the relationship between the total
nonstop seat capacity and passenger demand for this market are very close to linear. This
result is consistent with the results obtained from Chapter 4 since these two parameters of
this market grew at almost the identical rate based on the annual and overall percentage
changes over nine years (see Tables 4.9 and 4.10). Note that the result estimate for the
Miami-New York market is also very close to one, but it is insignificant due to the t-
statistic value. Additionally, there is no sign of a difference between the total seat
capacity elasticity of non-hub and hub-related markets since the ranges of the estimates
between these two markets are nearly the same.
Three markets including the New York-San Francisco, Anchorage-Seattle, and Los
Angeles-Washington, D.C markets, have acceptable R2 and significant t-statistic values,
meaning the seat capacity of these markets are demand-sensitive. However, the total seat
capacity is not as demand-sensitive for most of the 25 analyzed markets based on low R2
and insignificant t-statistic. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the changes in
passenger demand do not have much effect on the changes in total seat capacity.
5.4 Total Nonstop Seat Capacity-Nonstop Frequency
Correlation
In the previous section, although the correlation between passenger demand and total seat
capacity is somewhat weak, both aggregate and individual market analyses confirm that
the demand grew slightly faster than total seat capacity over the nine year period,
generating a likely increase in load factor in the top 25 markets. This section attempts to
verify the trends of aircraft size by examining the correlation between nonstop frequency
and total seat capacity. In general, the higher the flight frequency, the higher the seat
capacity would be provided in the market. One expects the elasticity of the total seat
capacity with respect to nonstop frequency to be positive. The analysis in Chapter 4
showed decreases in the average aircraft size over the nine-year period. For this matter,
the calculated elasticity of total seat capacity with respect to nonstop frequency should be
between zero and one. The greater-than-one value of elasticity estimates would mean
that the average aircraft size is larger because the increases in total seat-capacity are faster
than the increases in nonstop frequency.
5.4.1 Aggregate Model
0.80 307.06 57.09 Sig 090 43.07 Sig
Table 5.7: Aggregate Total Nonstop Seat Capacity Elasticity with Respect to Nonstop Frequency
The results can be interpreted that for each one percent change in aggregate nonstop
frequency of the top 25 markets, the total seat capacity changes by 0.9 percent. As
expected, the elasticity estimate of the seat capacity with respect to passenger demand is
positive and less than one. This implies that nonstop frequency grew at a faster rate than
seat capacity did over the nine-year period, and that airlines moved towards smaller
aircraft. The correlation between total seat capacity and nonstop frequency is close to
linear, slightly larger than the value of total seat capacity elasticity with respect to
passenger demand. Based on the t-statistic value, nonstop frequency is statistically
significant. The adjusted R2 value of 0.80 indicates that the nonstop frequency parameter
explains much of the variance in total seat capacity. Compared to the results of the total
seat capacity-passenger demand correlation model, the adjusted R2 value of this model is
much higher, suggesting that the nonstop frequency variable does a better job of
explaining the variance of the total seat capacity over the nine year period.
5.4.2 Individual Market Model
Los Angeles
New York
Miami
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Washington
Table 5.8: Elasticity Estimations of Total Nonstop Seat Capacity with Respect to
Nonstop Frequency
The total seat capacity elasticities with respect to nonstop frequency of these 25 markets
vary from 0.38 to 1.56. The result estimates of the individual-market analysis agree with
our a priori expectation and are consistent with the results obtained from the aggregate
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model (except a few markets that have elasticity greater than one). These result estimates
confirm the fact that average aircraft size tends to become smaller over time because
nonstop frequency increased at a faster rate than total seat capacity did. Note that the
elasticity estimate of the Las Vegas-New York market cannot be obtained because
nonstop frequency remains the same throughout nine years of the analysis (see Appendix
A).
Most of the markets have elasticity estimates around the high end of zero-to-one range,
indicating close to linear relationships. The Chicago-San Francisco and Anchorage-
Seattle markets are the only two markets among these 25 markets that show a very close
to linear relationship. In the previous section, the relationship between total seat capacity
and passenger demand of the Chicago-San Francisco market is also very close to linear
(elasticity estimate is 0.93). Because passenger demand, total seat capacity, and nonstop
frequency increased in the same proportion, average aircraft size should remain
unchanged. In fact, the average aircraft size associated with this market increased
slightly based on the annual percentage changes of 1.39 percent (see Table 4.9). This
contradiction in the results between the two analyses probably comes from errors of
averaging eight different changes over nine years. On the other hand, the correlation
between total seat capacity and passenger demand of the Anchorage-Seattle market is
0.43, much lower than Chicago-San Francisco. This implies that passenger demand of
Anchorage-Seattle market grew much faster than the market's total seat capacity did,
while the nonstop frequency and total seat capacity increased at about the same rate.
Therefore, the trends in airline supply of this market are either higher load factor and
stable average aircraft size, or stable load factor and slightly larger average aircraft size.
It happens that the second scenario agrees with the results obtained from the analysis of
Chapter 4 -- slight increases in average aircraft size (see Table 4.9).
The markets with the low-end elasticity (lower than 0.5) estimates include Los Angeles-
New York, Dallas-New York, and Boston-Chicago markets. The reason why these three
markets generate such low elasticity estimates is quite simple: the nonstop frequency
growth rates are much larger than total nonstop seat capacity growth rates compared to
the other markets. Notice that nonstop frequency of these three markets increased at the
annual rate of 6.65%, 7.56%, and 8.47%, while their total seat capacity only increased at
the annual rate of 2.74%, 3.74%, and 3.13%, respectively (see Tables 4.3 and 4.5).
The markets with a relative high elasticity estimate (greater than one) include the Los
Angeles-Honolulu, New York-West Palm Beach, and San Francisco-Washington, D.C.
markets. The elasticity estimates of these three markets are 1.10, 1.05, and 1.56,
respectively. This indicates that average aircraft size provided for these city pairs tends
to increase with nonstop frequency. The estimates of the first two markets disagree with
the results of the analysis in Chapter 4. The annual and overall percentage changes of
average aircraft size displayed decreasing trends in average aircraft size (see Tables 4.3,
4.4, 4.7, and 4.8). This is probably because the elasticity estimates are still very close to
one, reflecting a linear relationship between the changes of total seat capacity and
nonstop frequency. It is difficult to make any absolute conclusion regarding a direction
of the trends in average aircraft size because the total seat capacity and nonstop frequency
variables apparently change in the same proportion and direction. In this case, the annual
and overall percentage changes of average aircraft size seem to be better sources of
information. Nonetheless, the elasticity estimate of the San Francisco-Washington, D.C.
market is consistent with the annual and overall percentage changes presented in Chapter
4. Therefore, it can be confirmed that average aircraft size of this market has increased
over the nine-year period.
Unlike the correlation between total seat capacity and passenger demand, a link between
these two parameters is very strong because the t-statistic values of the independent
variable are significant for all 25 markets. Adjusted R2 values of around 0.9 do indicate
that nonstop frequency is an important factor in explaining the variance of total seat
capacity of the top 25 markets. In others words, the total seat capacity is highly
frequency sensitive, as one would expect.
5.5 Average Aircraft Size-Passenger Demand Correlation
Thus far, one could see that the correlation between total seat capacity and nonstop
frequency is significant and the latter grew at a faster rate than the first parameter based
on the elasticity estimates, which lead us to believe that smaller aircraft are more
commonly used in recent years. The objective of this section is to confirm whether or not
this finding of decreasing trends in aircraft size is true. If it were true, one would expect
poor correlation between average aircraft size and passenger demand because the average
aircraft size is likely to increase as passenger demand increases. If it were not the case,
the opposite results would be expected. However, the result expectation leans towards
the first scenario because of two reasons:
1. The analysis of percentage changes over the nine year period reported that average
aircraft size has decreased for a majority of the 25 analyzed markets (see Chapter 4).
2. The correlation of total seat capacity and passenger demand is poor based on the
regression results and, therefore, the correlation between demand and aircraft size
should not be strong also, given that the average aircraft size is the ratio of total seat
capacity to nonstop frequency.
Regardless of the model's significance, the calculated elasticity of average aircraft size
with respect to nonstop frequency should be positive because the higher the passenger.
demand, the greater the average aircraft size should be.
5.5.1 Aggregate Model
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Table 5.9: Aggregate Average Aircraft Size Elasticity with Respect to Passenger Demand
The results can be interpreted that for each one percent change in aggregate passenger
demand of the top 25 markets, average aircraft size changes by 0.02 percent. This
implies that average aircraft size hardly changed as passenger demand grew. However,
this elasticity estimate is not statistically significant due to the t-statistic test. The
adjusted R2 value of 0.15 indicates that passenger demand variable does not explain much
of the variance in average aircraft size. The results agree with our a priori expectation in
terms of direction and significance of the model. The results of this model are also similar
to the results obtained from the total seat capacity-passenger demand correlation model in
the sense that the changes in passenger demand do not have much effect on the changes
in average aircraft size.
5.5.2 Individual Market Models
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Passenger DemandTable 5.10: Elasticity Estimations
The average aircraft size elasticities with respect to passenger demand of these 25
markets vary from -1.46 to 0.38. The range of the estimates is considered to be narrow.
Most of the result estimates of the individual-market analysis disagree with our a priori
expectation because of negative estimates. Negative elasticity means that for a one
percent increase in passenger demand of any particular market, average aircraft size of
that market decreases by some percentage. Note that all of the statistically significant
estimates are negative, while all of the positive estimates are insignificant. The
explanation for a negative estimate is that average aircraft size of a particular market
decreased, while passenger demand increased in the past nine years. This suggests that
nonstop frequency increased in this time period.
Two markets, including Los Angeles-New York and Boston-Chicago, show good fitting
regression (adjusted R2 values are close to one) and significant elasticity. The results
corresponding to these two markets can be interpreted that for each one percent increase
in passenger demand, average aircraft size of that market decreased by 1.15 and 1.46
percent. These negative estimates are consistent in the sense that decreasing trends in
average aircraft size of these two markets were observed from the percentage change
analysis (see Table 4.3 and 4.4). However, they are meaningless in terms of conceptual
intuition.
Similar to the correlation between total seat capacity and passenger demand, a link
between these two parameters is weak due to insignificant t-statistic values of the
independent variable and low adjusted R2 values of the model. At this point, it is safe to
conclude that changes in passenger demand do not create a strong impact in the way that
airlines assign seat capacity and aircraft size.
5.6 Average Aircraft Size-Nonstop Frequency Correlation
The last potentially meaningful correlation is the correlation between average aircraft size
and nonstop frequency. From the above correlation choices of analysis, decreasing trends
of aircraft size used in the top 25 markets are revealed. Interestingly, the variable which
heavily influences such trends is not passenger demand but, instead, flight frequency.
Therefore, this section examines to what extent changes in nonstop frequency affect
changes in average aircraft size. In general, the higher the flight frequency, the smaller
the average aircraft size should be because the number of passengers boarding on each
flight tend to be fewer as more flights are offered during a day. The result estimates are
expected to be negative because these two parameters move in the opposite direction. In
terms of magnitudes, range between zero and one is expected because not only is it
theoretically easier for airlines to adjust the flight frequency over a wide range of value
than it is to alter drastically the aircraft size, but also the aggregate percentage change
analysis confirms that aggregate annual percentage changes of flight frequency (3.53%
annually and 30.63% overall) are larger than the aggregate annual percentage changes of
average aircraft size (-0.88% annually and -6.97% overall) of the total 25 markets (see
Table 4.1).
5.6.1 Aggregate Model
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Table 5.11: Aggregate Average Aircraft Size Elasticity with Respect to Nonstop Frequency
According to the results shown in Table 5.11, for each one percent increase in aggregate
nonstop frequency of the top 25 markets, the average aircraft size of the top 25 markets
decreases by 0.1 percent. As expected, the elasticity estimate of this model is negative in
terms of direction and between zero and negative one in terms of magnitude. This
implies that nonstop frequency grew, while average aircraft size decreased over the nine-
year period. Based on the t-statistic value, the estimate is statistically significant. The
adjusted R2 value of 0.80 indicates that the nonstop frequency parameter explains much
of the variance in average aircraft size. Compared to the results of the average aircraft
size-passenger demand correlation model, the adjusted R2 value of this model is much
higher, suggesting that the nonstop frequency variable does a better job of explaining the
variance of the average aircraft size over the nine year period.
5.6.2 Individual Market Models
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Table 5.12: Elasticity Estimations ofAverage Aircraft Size with Respect to Nonstop Frequency
The average aircraft size elasticities with respect to nonstop frequency of these 25
markets vary from -0.62 to 0.56. The range of these estimates is 1.18 (1-0.621+0.56),
considered to be narrow. The result estimates of the individual-market analysis agree
with our a priori expectation in terms of both direction and magnitude. However, only
11 markets have elasticity estimates with a significant t-statistic value. The Dallas-New
York market is the one that has the highest negative elasticity among these 11 markets. It
is logical because this city-pair market involves hub operations (at Dallas/Fort Worth). In
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general, flight frequency increase substantially when airline(s) build(s) their hub at a
particular airport, and as a consequence, aircraft size decreases because fewer passengers
are carried in each flight. Notice that other hub-related markets with a statistically
significant elasticity estimate, including the Chicago-Los Angeles, Chicago-Phoenix,
Boston-Chicago, and Chicago-Dallas markets, also hold high negative elasticity estimates
(close to -0.62 rather than to zero). In addition, the elasticity estimate of the Las Vegas-
New York market cannot be obtained because nonstop frequency was constant
throughout nine years of the analysis (see Appendix A).
Five markets have positive elasticities which contradict the expectation. These markets
include Los Angeles-Honolulu, Chicago-San Francisco, New York-West Palm Beach,
Anchorage-Seattle, and San Francisco-Washington, D.C. Among these five markets,
only the elasticity of the San Francisco-Washington, D.C. market is statistically
significant. The estimate is positive because average aircraft size increased by 0.93
percent annually and 4.71 percent overall of the nine-year period (see Tables 4.9 and
4.10). Because Table 5.10 showed that the elasticity of aircraft size with respect to
passenger demand of the San Francisco-Washington, D.C. market is not significant, the
conclusion is now more apparent that changes in aircraft size used in this market are
sensitive to changes in flight frequency.
There are 11 markets in which neither passenger demand nor flight frequency is a good
independent variable in explaining the variance of average aircraft size of these markets
based on the insignificant t-statistic value of the estimates. These markets are listed as
following:
New York
Atlanta
Fort Lauderdale
Chicago
New York
Chicago
New York
San Francisco
Anchorage
Los Angeles
Chicago
San Juan
New York
New York
San Francisco
West Palm Beach
Orlando
Tampa
Honolulu
Seattle
Washigton
Denver
Table 5.13: List of Markets with No Correlation to Demand and Frequency
One observes that these markets involve New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles. The
major airport of these three cities, including JFK, ORD, and LAX are ranked among the
top 10 most congested airports in the world. Therefore, the other potential independent
variables, which may have a strong correlation with the average aircraft size variable of
these markets, include congestion level of airports of these city-pair markets.
3
The other 14 markets are divided into three cases: (1) only demand sensitive, (2) only
frequency sensitive, and (3) both demand and frequency sensitive. Only two of these 14
markets, including Los Angeles-Honolulu and Los Angeles-Seattle are demand sensitive
only. Notice that these two markets involve Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), a
highly congested airport. It is possible that frequency variable is not a significant factor
for the changes in aircraft size because airlines are already forced by airport authority to
limit the number of flights offered each day, or a particular departing time window is
reserved for more beneficial markets. Therefore, changes in aircraft size strongly relate
to changes in passenger demand instead.
Seven of the 14 markets are only frequency sensitive. These markets are listed as
following:
3 Congested airports may force an airline to use bigger aircraft in order to carry more passengers per flight,
while airlines are allowed to offer high flight frequency in uncongested airports
Miami
New York
Chicago
Dallas-Fort Worth
Las Vegas
Chicago
San Francisco
New TOrK
Orlando
Los Angeles
New York
New York
Dallas-Fort Worth
Washington
Table 5.14: List of Frequency-Sensitive Markets
Possible reasons why changes in aircraft size of these markets correlated only with
changes in frequency are because competitiveness between airlines in these markets is
extremely intense. Therefore, each airline attempts to gain market share by increasing
flight frequency in order to attract more passengers. Finally, the remaining five markets
are both demand and frequency sensitive. These markets are listed as following:
Rank Market-Pair
1 Los Angeles New York
2 New York San Francisco
14 Chicago Phoenix
15 Boston Chicago
24 Boston San Francisco
Table 5.15: List of Demand-and-Frequency-Sensitive Markets
In terms of the model's fitting quality, only seven markets hold high R2 values (see Table
5.12). Most of the 25 markets hold low adjusted R2 values. This indicates that that
nonstop frequency does not explain much of the variance in average aircraft size for most
of the top 25 markets.
5.7 Conclusion
This chapter has presented the correlation between passenger demand and airline supply,
and the correlation among airline supply variables of the top 25 U.S. long-haul domestic
markets. The analysis focused on five meaningful correlations, which included the
correlation between:
1. passenger demand and airfare
2. total seat capacity and passenger demand
3. total seat capacity and nonstop frequency
4. average aircraft size and passenger demand, and
5. average aircraft size and nonstop frequency
The time period of analysis is between 1987 and 1995. Similar to Chapter 4, each
correlation was divided into two sections, aggregate and individual markets. The primary
objective was to estimate elasticity of the dependent variable with respect to the
corresponding independent variable and decide whether or not the correlation between
these two variables is significant based on the t-statistic and R2 values.
Passenger Demand-Airfare Correlation: Two different methods are used for estimating
the price elasticity with respect to passenger demand of these 25 markets. The first one is
the Midpoint direct calculation method. The second one is the Non-Linear Regression
(NLR) method. The elasticity estimates obtained from both methods differ in magnitude
at the aggregate level, but are acceptably consistent with each other at the individual
market level. Based on the individual-market analysis, the airfare elasticity with respect
to passenger demand of 25 markets ranges from -0.54 to -3.22, with the average value of
-1.48. In the aggregate analysis, the results obtained from the Midpoint method is -1.39,
which is very close to the average estimate of 25 individual markets. On the other hand,
the results obtained from the NLR method is -0.35, which is near the low end of the range
of the individual-market analysis. For both aggregate and individual markets, the R2
value of the regression model showed a poor fitting. The differences in the results and
poorly fitting quality of given data make it difficult to conclude the accurate airfare
elasticity for these top 25 markets. A possible reason behind these poor quality results
may involve the fact that changes in passenger demand do not depend upon changes in
airfares only. The other inherent variables may include flight frequency, service quality,
per capita income, and population.
Total Nonstop Seat Capacitv-Passenger Demand: The total seat capacity elasticity with
respect to passenger demand of the 25 markets ranges from 0.39 to 2.37. Most of these
25 markets have positive elasticity, which agrees with our a priori expectation. Note that
only five markets have the counterintuitive results (negative elasticity) because the total
seat capacity of these markets apparently decreased as passenger demand increased,
while both variables should be increasing simultaneously. The elasticity estimates of 12
markets are statistically significant. The elasticity estimate obtained from the aggregate
analysis is equal to 0.82 and statistically significant. However, the fitting quality of this
model is poor.
Total Nonstop Seat Capacity-Nonstop Frequency: The total seat capacity elasticity with
respect to nonstop frequency of the 25 markets ranges from 0.38 to 1.56. The elasticity
estimates of all 25 markets are statistically significant and agree with our a priori
expectation. The elasticity estimate obtained from the aggregate analysis is equal to 0.9
and also statistically significant. The fitting quality of this model is extremely good.
Averaze Aircraft Size-Passenger Demand: The average aircraft size elasticity with
respect to passenger demand of the 25 markets ranges from -1.46 to -0.15. Most of the
estimates are counterintuitive since they are negatives (the positive elasticity is expected
because the greater the passenger demand, the higher the aircraft size should be). The
elasticity estimates of 12 markets are not statistically significant and the R2 values
suggest that the fitting quality of this model is poor. The elasticity estimate obtained from
the aggregate analysis is equal to 0.02 and not statistically significant. The R2 value of
the aggregate analysis is equal to 0.15, indicating the same result as the individual market
analysis.
Average Aircraft Size--Nonstop Frequency: The average aircraft size elasticity with
respect to nonstop frequency of 25 markets ranges from -0.62 to 0.56. The elasticity
estimates of 12 markets are statistically significant, while the estimates of the other 13
markets are not. The elasticity estimate obtained from the aggregate analysis is equal to -
0.1 and also statistically significant. The fitting quality of this model is good overall.
According to the results obtained from all correlation models, one could see that the
relationships between the airline supply variables (including total seat capacity and
average aircraft size) and passenger demand are somewhat weak. Therefore, changes in
demand are not significant to the changes in airlines' seat inventory. In contrast, links
between total seat capacity and nonstop frequency, and between average aircraft size and
nonstop frequency are very strong. Both models suggest that airlines prefer to use small
aircraft rather than large aircraft for these top 25 markets. The changes in average
aircraft size of the nonstop flights of these 25 markets mostly depend on how the nonstop
frequency changes.
Chapter 6: Conclusions
6.1 Introduction
Airline deregulation has brought several positive impacts to both users and providers in
the U.S. air transport industry. Since 1978, the number of air travelers has increased
significantly. One reason for such an increase is the fact that competition between
airlines increased substantially in the deregulation era. For airlines to survive as well as
to be profitable, they have to compete heavily in fares and services (i.e., flight frequency,
network configurations and quality). Therefore, airfares are lower and more flights in
many origin/destination markets are available.
This thesis has attempted to measure the changes in passenger demand and airline
supplies including airfare, flight frequency, total seat capacity, and average aircraft size,
as well as determine the correlations between these parameters. The thesis has
concentrated on the top 25 longhaul U.S. domestic markets over the time period between
1987 and 1995. The changes in passenger demand and airline supplies were presented in
the annual and overall (difference between the first and last years of the selected time
period) percentage differences. The correlations between these parameters were obtained
by developing non-linear regression models. It is important to note that the choice
between a linear and a non-linear form properly revolves around the question of which
underlying behavior one really wants to model. The first section of this chapter
summarizes the results of the percentage change analysis. The second section
summarizes the results of the correlations between the analyzed parameters. Finally, the
third section provides directions for further research studies.
6.2 Summary of Percentage Change Analysis
Among the top 25 U.S. domestic O&D markets, five different types of trends in
passenger demand and airline supply are revealed. The first type involves the set of
markets with increasing passenger demand, nonstop frequency, and weekly seat capacity,
but decreasing average aircraft size. The majority of the top 25 markets (13 markets)
belong to this type. Interestingly, nonstop frequency increased at a faster rate than did
passenger demand and weekly seat capacity over the nine-year period. The high
frequency flight schedule distributes origin/destination passengers among more flights.
Therefore, airlines allocate smaller aircraft when they increase their flight frequency.
This strategy has two advantages. First, total operating costs associated with small
aircraft are typically less expensive than with large aircraft. Second, travelers are
attracted to an airline with higher flight frequency because they have more options on
flight times that would fit best with their personal schedules.
The second trend type involves the set of decreasing-demand markets with increases in
weekly seat capacity and flight frequency, and decreases in average aircraft size. Only
two markets belong to this type. Note that passenger demand of these markets decreased
very slightly. However, the trends are counterintuitive because it is unlikely for airlines
to provide the larger number of seats and flights for less passenger demand. The markets
involve hub operations since more flights are flown into and out of the hub-related.
airport. Therefore, flight frequency and weekly seat capacity increased, while passenger
demand remained almost unchanged. For the same reason given in the previous case,
increases in flight frequency would decrease aircraft size.
The third type involves the set of markets with increasing demand, while their flight
frequency, weekly seat capacity, and average aircraft size decreased over the nine-year
period. The results led us to believe that the average load factor of the flights that served
these markets is higher because passenger demand grew at a faster rate than both flight
frequency and weekly seat capacity.
The fourth type involves the set of markets with passenger demand, nonstop frequency,
weekly nonstop seat capacity, and average aircraft size increasing over the nine-year
period. For this trend type, the number of passengers increased substantially over the
nine-year period. Because of this significant growth of passenger demand, increasing
seat capacity solely by providing more flights is not enough. Airlines must allocate a
larger aircraft size. In addition, passenger demand grew at a much faster rate than
nonstop frequency and weekly seat capacity did. Therefore, higher load factors on the
flights serving these markets is expected.
The fifth type is a special case and does not fit in any of the above categories. One of the
two markets is the Fort Lauderdale-New York market. Both demand and airline supplies,
including flight frequency, weekly seat capacity, and average aircraft size of this market
decreased over time. In this case, the market's rank will likely fall in the near future.
The other market is the Chicago-Denver market. The special characteristic of this market
is that airlines allocated bigger aircraft size and provided less nonstop frequency and
weekly seat capacity for larger passenger demand.
In terms of airfares, the results showed that airfares of 15 of the top 25 markets decreased
over the nine-year period. However, airfares tended to increase for the markets
associated with hub airports. This is because the dominant airline has greater power to
increase the fare levels.
Overall, passenger demand and nonstop frequency increased at a very high rate compared
to the changes of the other variables. The total weekly seat capacity also increased but at
a much slower rate than demand and frequency did over the nine-year period. Note that
the trends in total weekly seat capacity of all 25 markets were not very stable in the first
six years of the analysis, but were increasing smooth afterwards. The average aircraft size
decreased by approximately 15 seats per departure since 1987. Airfares of all 25 markets
increased in the first three years of the analysis (1987- 1989) but continued to decrease by
a few dollars every year since 1989.
6.3 Summary of Correlation Analysis
The non-linear regression models were developed in order to verify the relationships
between passenger demand and airline supply, and between airline supply measures. The
first model examines the relationship between passenger demand and airfare. This model
was developed to study the responses of travelers when airlines change their ticket price.
The results showed that the price level of an airline ticket is significant to how demand
changes. The range of calculated elasticity is between -1.0 and -2.0 for most of the top
25 markets. Indeed, there are a few markets whose demand is extremely price-sensitive
(elasticity less than -2.0) and price-insensitive (elasticity greater than -1.0 and very close
to zero). The markets with extremely price-sensitive demand include vacation
destinations such as Orlando and Las Vegas, while the markets with extremely price-
insensitive demand include business markets. This is logical because leisure travelers are
sensitive to price, while business travelers are not.
The second model examines the relationship between total seat capacity and passenger
demand. This model was developed to verify to what extent airlines adjust their total seat
capacity when demand increases. It also indicates how the average aircraft size of the top
25 markets changes in the nine-year period. Surprisingly, the results did not show strong
correlation between these two variables. The calculated elasticities of most markets are
not significant and the model fitting is very poor. Therefore, no solid conclusion can be
made from this model.
The third model examines the relationship between total seat capacity and nonstop
frequency. Because the correlation between total seat capacity and passenger demand is
weak, it was hoped that the correlation between these two parameters would be strong.
The results showed that our a priori intuition was correct. The calculated elasticities are
significant for every of the 25 markets. This model has a much better fit than the second
model. The range of calculated elasticity is between zero and one for most of the top 25
markets. This implies that nonstop frequency grew at a faster rate than total seat capacity
did over the nine-year period. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that average aircraft
size decreased over time.
The fourth model examines the relationship between average aircraft size and passenger
demand. This model was developed to find how airlines allocate size of aircraft in
response to the growth of air travel demand. The results are somewhat similar to the
second model. The calculated elasticities of most markets are not significant and the
model fitting is also very poor. Therefore, total passenger demand is not a significant
variable for the changes in aircraft size.
The last model examines the relationship between average aircraft size and nonstop
frequency. The model is well correlated and the calculated elasticities are significant for
most of the 25 markets. The results showed that the majority of elasticity estimates stay
within the range of 0.0 and -0.5, indicating smaller aircraft are allocated when airlines'
flight frequency increases. Therefore, nonstop frequency is a significant variable for the
changes in aircraft size.
In general, the following phenomena were acknowledged from these five correlation
models:
1. Passenger demand of the top 25 markets is considered to be price-elastic, especially
of the vacation city-pair markets. On the contrary, passenger demand of the hub-
related markets is not very sensitive to the changes in airfares.
2. Changes in passenger demand do not strongly relate to how airlines allocate seat
capacity and aircraft size. However, flight frequency is the main factor that drives the
way airlines manage their seat capacity.
3. Airlines have increased the flight frequency significantly in recent years of
deregulation. The flight frequency grew even faster than passenger demand did from
1987 to 1995. In response to high frequency schedule, utilization of smaller aircraft
increased. Therefore, it is possible that a large aircraft, such as 747, will vanish from
the longhaul U.S. domestic markets in the future.
6.4 Directions for Further Studies
This thesis has studied the trends in passenger demand and airline supplies for the long-
haul U.S. domestic market only. As one direction of further inquiry, the study could be
extended to short-haul, medium-haul, and international markets. The comparison
between these types (by distance) of a market could also be a valuable study. Second,
although this thesis showed that the average aircraft size of the top 25 longhaul U.S.
domestic has declined over time, it did not specify the manufacturing types of aircraft
being used by commercial airlines. The thesis could be expanded to include the type of
aircraft in order to understand how airlines have composed their fleet in the deregulated
years. Third, it is reasonable to state the rapid growth in passenger demand and flight
frequency will eventually outstrip existing airports and air traffic control systems. In
fact, most of the major U.S. airports have already faced severe congestion problems,
especially during the peak period (usually around late afternoon). For that matter, it
would be of value to study the sensitivity of congestion in major U.S. airports with
respect to the increases in passenger demand and flight frequency. However, measuring a
congestion level in quantitative terms could be difficult to achieve since the characteristic
of one airport may be entirely different from the others' in terms of design, public policy,
weather conditions, and location. Researchers must impose some standard criteria so that
congestion levels of different airports are measured under the same quantitative basis.
The thesis and suggested thesis extensions could be of value to airlines, aircraft
manufacturers, and airport planners in detailing the ways that aircraft be properly
designed to match the futures needs of airlines; how to mitigate congestion problems,
perhaps by controlling airlines' flight frequency; and proposing that expansions of
current airports and/or constructions of new airports be well-planned to accommodate
rapid growth of air transport demand and supplies.
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Data of Passenger Demand and Airline Supply from 1987 to 1995
Passenger Demand CPI Adjusted Airfare Weekly Nonstop Freq. (August) Weekly Seat Capacity (August) Average Aircraft Size
Year LAX-EWR LAX-JFK Total LAX-EWR LAX-JFK W.Average LAX-EWR LAX-JFK Total LAX-EWR LAX-JFK Total LAX-EWR LAX-JFK Total
1987 901,090 1,092,530 1,993,620 $196.02 $271.27 $237.26 49 123 172 15,050 35,155 50,205 307 286 292
1988 837,240 1,175,540 2,012,780 $202.70 $299.72 $259.36 49 142 191 13,560 38,550 52,110 277 271 273
1989 770,930 1,435,690 2,206,620 $252.22 $299.27 $282.83 56 131 187 14,812 35,664 50,476 265 272 270
1990 845,750 1,397,970 2,243,720 $251.72 $299.85 $281.71 84 131 215 19,433 34,715 54,148 231 265 252
1991 892,170 1,399,810 2,291,980 $233.11 $256.62 $247.47 84 131 215 18,821 36,293 55,114 224 277 256
1992 830,980 1,478,240 2,309,220 $205.64 $245.10 $230.90 70 158 228 15,141 37,614 52,755 216 238 231
1993 786,620 1,364,290 2,150,910 $243.18 $276.21 $264.13 70 140 210 15,141 35,967 51,108 216 257 243
1994 822,000 1,459,540 2,281,540 $227.15 $246.21 $239.34 77 143 220 16,758 35,657 52,415 218 249 238
1995 789,890 1,656,010 2,445,900 $217.17 $222.72 $220.93 89 189 278 17,216 44,135 61,351 193 234 221
Passenger Demand CPI Adjusted Airfare Weekly Nonstop Freq. (August) Weekly Seat Capacit (August) Average Aircraft Size
Year EWR-SFO JFK-SFO Total EWR-SFO JFK-SFO W.Average EWR-SFO JFK-SFO Total EWR-SFO JFK-SFO Total EWR-SFO JFK-SFO Total
1987 590,210 571,070 1,161,280 $231.79 $310.89 $270.68 28 76 104 7,413 19,775 27,188 265 260 261
1988 590,720 553,650 1,144,370 $228.10 $341.83 $283.12 34 69 103 8,390 18,200 26,590 247 264 258
1989 571,310 836,560 1,407,870 $287.71 $316.75 $304.97 35 76 111 8,680 19,306 27,986 248 254 252
1990 574,460 830,270 1,404,730 $284.85 $310.49 $300.01 35 83 118 8,764 22,957 31,721 250 277 269
1991 605,910 864,440 1,470,350 $267.55 $270.81 $269.46 35 83 118 8,141 21,571 29,712 233 260 252
1992 609,390 882,360 1,491,750 $244.83 $256.43 $251.69 35 97 132 8,332 22,712 31,044 238 234 235
1993 599,950 837,170 1,437,120 $280.07 $313.03 $299.27 42 105 147 9,686 22,637 32,323 231 216 220
1994 664,280 906,940 1,571,220 $267.25 $285.15 $277.58 56 115 171 12,306 25,959 38,265 220 226 224
1995 675,010 1,011,560 1,686,570 $255.41 $259.80 $258.04 56 114 170 10,570 26,211 36,781 189 230 216
Passenger Demand CPI Adjusted Airfare Weekly Nonstop Freq. (Auust) Weekly Seat Ca acity (August)
Year MIA-EWR MIA-JFK MIA-LGA Total MIA-EWR MIA-JFK MIA-LGA W.Average MIA-EWR MIA-JFK MIA-LGA Total MIA-EWR MIA-JFK MIA-LGA Total
1987 450,840 440,920 749,910 1,641,670 $139.91 $147.21 $158.36 $150.30 28 46 55 129 7,994 9,647 13,292 30,933
1988 491,330 488,540 830,680 1,810,550 $153.91 $153.05 $161.89 $157.34 49 84 126 259 9,926 17,609 30,751 58,286
1989 428,700 362,220 838,960 1,629,880 $161.80 $161.46 $161.44 $161.54 63 56 104 223 8,405 11,448 18,091 37,944
1990 552,750 333,290 1,042,450 1,928,490 $133.04 $127.31 $135.31 $133.28 63 97 97 257 9,297 18,243 18,442 45,982
1991 500,920 379,290 672,710 1,552,920 $150.97 $146.23 $166.88 $156.71 78 79 91 248 11,596 18,972 14,417 44,985
1992 485,700 398,480 679,080 1,563,260 $155.97 $147.20 $172.60 $160.96 57 80 90 227 8,454 15,947 13,723 38,124
1993 451,880 540,450 641,870 1,634,200 $152.09 $135.75 $178.64 $157.12 70 90 107 267 12,160 18,216 15,984 46,360
1994 602,950 653,880 674,260 1,931,090 $118.11 $113.00 $141.47 $124.53 70 108 105 283 12,502 21,401 15,585 49,488
1995 602,310 934,160 556,990 2,093,460 $122.64 $107.12 $151.71 $123.45 71 100 100 271 12,729 22,614 14,886 50,229
to,
Appendix A:
Average Aircraft Size
Year MIA-EWR MIA-JFK MIA-LGA Total
1987 286 210 242 240
1988 203 210 244 225
1989 133 204 174 170
1990 148 188 190 179
1991 149 240 158 181
1992 148 199 152 168
1993 174 202 149 174
1994 179 198 148 175
1995 179 226 149 185
Passenger Demand CPI Adjusted Airfare Weekly Nonstop Freq. (August) Weekly Seat Ca acity (August)
Year EWR-MCO JFK-MCO LGA-MCO Total EWR-MCO JFK-MCO LGA-MCO W.Average EWR-MCO JFK-MCO LGA-MCO Total EWR-MCO JFK-MCO LGA-MCO Total
1987 637,560 301,160 462,040 1,400,760 $136.45 $135.76 $138.81 $137.08 56 35 42 133 10,339 7,511 7,196 25,046
1988 681,220 304,280 591,290 1,576,790 $135.19 $133.81 $134.83 $134.79 77 56 63 196 11,921 9,261 11,417 32,599
1989 643,290 230,570 658,220 1,532,080 $137.40 $145.47 $141.66 $140.45 98 42 70 210 13,797 6,314 10,808 30,919
1990 795,560 227,450 902,040 1,925,050 $119.56 $116.08 $122.11 $120.34 90 56 89 235 13,514 8,113 14,809 36,436
1991 704,390 254,050 657,250 1,615,690 $142.99 $129.19 $149.90 $143.63 70 63 69 202 13,223 11,060 11,061 35,344
1992 789,900 194,690 714,710 1,699,300 $140.75 $142.43 $146.94 $143.54 119 35 105 259 15,921 6,832 15,105 37,858
1993 968,020 167,180 723,880 1,859,080 $116.67 $129.40 $137.68 $126.00 106 32 112 250 15,089 4,521 15,938 35,548
1994 970,980 313,190 702,830 1,987,000 $108.32 $111.31 $119.74 $112.83 86 66 83 235 16,799 9,394 11,547 37,740
1995 940,380 316,600 661,170 1,918,150 $118.73 $120.28 $127.29 $121.93 102 46 61 209 15,761 6,740 8,113 30,614
Average Aircraft Size
EWR-MCO JFK-MCO LGA-MCO Total
185 215 171 188
155 165 181 166
141 150 154 147
150 145 166 155
189 176 160 175
134 195 144 146
142 141 142 142
195 142 139 161
155 147 133 146
Year
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Passenger Demand CPI Adjusted Airfare Weekly Nonstop Freq. (August) Weekly Seat Capacity (August)Year ATL-EWR ATL-JFK ATL-LGA Total ATL-EWR ATL-JFK ATL-LGA W.Average ATL-EWR ATL-JFK ATL-LGA Total ATL-EWR ATL-JFK ATL-LGA Total1987 486,890 56,540 618,870 1,162,300 $178.57 $154.51 $194.37 $185.81 97 21 124 242 19,087 3,052 21,540 43,6791988 495,040 100,230 650,660 1,245,930 $246.76 $163.52 $238.62 $235.81 91 21 112 224 16,241 3,171 18,871 38,2831989 487,190 50,180 641,340 1,178,710 $236.04 $179.92 $235.29 $233.25 104 14 111 229 17,111 2,114 21,177 40,4021990 529,980 41,300 712,410 1,283,690 $218.84 $163.02 $226.92 $221.53 104 14 126 244 17,982 2,051 23,226 43,2591991 494,720 61,330 620,260 1,176,310 $227.27 $157.84 $229.48 $224.82 82 14 96 192 11,748 2,051 18,064 31,8631992 609,140 152,120 528,610 1,289,870 $192.98 $152.26 $233.11 $204.62 86 46 63 195 13,376 7,653 14,385 35,414
1993 879,840 142,770 503,290 1,525,900 $138.22 $147.69 $229.42 $169.19 124 62 63 249 20,058 9,672 13,570 43,3001994 1,069,190 124,740 545,270 1,739,200 $115.64 $130.58 $188.74 $139.63 124 49 80 253 20,870 8,139 15,059 44,068
1995 1,056,740 111,000 486,730 1,654,470 $138.43 $145.02 $228.13 $165.26 170 40 106 316 25,904 7,172 16,966 50,042
Average Aircraft Size
Year ATL-EWR ATL-JFK ATL-LGA Total
1987 197 145 174 180
1988 178 151 168 171
1989 165 151 191 176
1990 173 147 184 177
1991 143 147 188 166
1992 156 166 228 182
1993 162 156 215 174
1994 168 166 188 174
1995 152 179 160 158
Passenger Demand CPI Adjusted Airfare Weekly Nonstop Freq. (August) Weekly Seat Capacit (August) Average Aircraft SizeYear EWR-SJU JFK-SJU Total EWR-SJU JFK-SJU W.Average EWR-SJU JFK-SJU Total EWR-SJU JFK-SJU Total EWR-SJU JFK-SJU Total1987 381,180 1,083,450 1,464,630 $153.54 $152.38 $152.68 32 91 123 6,340 24,472 30,812 198 269 2511988 391,570 1,121,620 1,513,190 $189.67 $184.01 $185.47 35 98 133 8,162 26,467 34,629 233 270 2601989 307,680 1,006,600 1,314,280 $196.56 $179.35 $183.38 28 98 126 6,503 23,996 30,499 232 245 2421990 348,330 1,072,620 1,420,950 $191.74 $180.07 $182.93 32 84 116 7,019 22,008 29,027 219 262 2501991 289,450 1,032,470 1,321,920 $196.01 $176.32 $180.63 28 105 133 5,999 27,594 33,593 214 263 2531992 281,550 1,002,320 1,283,870 $188.49 $172.07 $175.67 35 93 128 5,558 23,839 29,397 159 256 2301993 359,060 930,430 1,289,490 $168.31 $163.24 $164.65 38 79 117 7,338 21,165 28,503 193 268 2441994 360,190 1,019,610 1,379,800 $156.53 $145.66 $148.50 35 85 120 6,923 23,438 30,361 198 276 2531995 475,760 1,037,540 1,513,300 $137.76 $133.20 $134.63 56 80 136 10,073 22,272 32,345 180 278 238
LAX-HNL
Year Demand Airfare Freqeuncy Capacity A/C Size
1987 873,580 $174.25 134 42,071 314
1988 1,314,130 $160.00 141 42,057 298
1989 1,089,560 $166.39 142 40,826 288
1990 1,146,810 $156.32 148 45,149 305
1991 1,047,740 $184.23 147 44,469 303
1992 982,150 $178.92 124 37,137 299
1993 1,171,260 $162.77 127 38,342 302
1994 1,307,990 $155.27 132 37,746 286
1995 1,381,210 $149.59 125 35,951 288
Passenger Demand CPI Adjusted Airfare Weekly Nonsto Freq. (August) Weekly Seat Ca acity (August)
Year FLL-EWR FLL-JFK FLL-LGA Total FLL-EWR FLL-JFK FLL-LGA W.Average FLL-EWR FLL-JFK FLL-LGA Total FLL-EWR FLL-JFK FLL-LGA Total
1987 636,370 445,620 752,910 1,834,900 $147.39 $145.54 $154.44 $149.83 47 28 62 137 8,536 6,258 11,738 26,532
1988 651,870 383,360 810,790 1,846,020 $149.65 $146.72 $157.35 $152.42 61 21 56 138 9,956 3,857 9,485 23,298
1989 576,490 282,720 780,660 1,639,870 $157.91 $157.09 $169.63 $163.35 49 21 35 105 7,620 3,619 7,000 18,239
1990 666,020 352,650 991,220 2,009,890 $130.09 $121.91 $133.61 $130.39 50 42 77 169 7,696 6,720 13,944 28,360
1991 568,850 341,120 697,470 1,607,440 $149.67 $142.08 $162.18 $153.49 49 49 49 147 7,807 7,714 8,274 23,795
1992 640,810 271,810 717,330 1,629,950 $141.09 $143.23 $155.05 $147.59 49 35 48 132 7,301 5,355 7,705 20,361
1993 863,070 207,920 707,960 1,778,950 $125.80 $134.18 $149.65 $136.27 63 14 69 146 10,248 2,345 11,151 23,744
1994 771,040 308,700 674,240 1,753,980 $114.67 $118.57 $125.51 $119.52 63 33 55 151 12,824 4,475 8,345 25,644
1995 654,870 366,140 609,640 1,630,650 $123.60 $117.52 $130.84 $124.94 57 27 41 125 8,429 4,795 6,577 19,801
FLL-EWR FLL-JFK
182 224
163 184
156 172
154 160
159 157
149 153
163 168
204 136
148 178
FLL-LGA Total
189 194
169 169
200 174
181 168
169 162
161 154
162 163
152 170
160 158
Average A
Year
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
ircraft Size
Passenger Demand CPI Adjusted Airfare Weekly Nonstop Freq. (August) Weekly Seat Capacit (August) Average Aircraft SizeYear ORD-LAX ORD-ONT Total ORD-LAX ORD-ONT W.Average ORD-LAX ORD-ONT Total ORD-LAX ORD-ONT Total ORD-LAX ORD-ONT Total
1987 923,080 130,260 1,053,340 $184.20 $198.87 $186.01 163 42 205 37,804 5,523 43,327 232 132 2111988 1,029,260 163,230 1,192,490 $167.34 $191.47 $170.65 124 48 172 28,804 7,024 35,828 232 146 2081989 907,580 165,480 1,073,060 $237.27 $238.57 $237.47 138 56 194 30,825 8,176 39,001 223 146 2011990 987,810 158,110 1,145,920 $247.85 $251.97 $248.42 156 55 211 34,692 7,698 42,390 222 140 2011991 972,540 171,770 1,144,310 $220.48 $213.69 $219.46 165 62 227 36,300 8,426 44,726 220 136 1971992 1,043,050 206,050 1,249,100 $206.23 $196.03 $204.55 146 63 209 33,008 8,687 41,695 226 138 1991993 909,760 180,030 1,089,790 $246.83 $223.81 $243.03 161 63 224 34,769 8,547 43,316 216 136 1931994 927,590 171,190 1,098,780 $230.60 $214.84 $228.14 173 49 222 34,682 6,559 41,241 200 134 1861995 914,930 150,720 1,065,650 $229.93 $205.10 $226.42 264 42 306 46,163 5,698 51,861 175 136 169
LAX-SEA
Year Demand Airfare Freqeuncy Capacity A/C Size
1987 792,870 $165.14 182 26,114 143
1988 655,030 $155.53 157 24,623 157
1989 602,920 $189.31 157 23,468 149
1990 751,530 $170.42 212 31,208 147
1991 749,420 $169.49 209 29,849 143
1992 817,430 $144.30 192 27,141 141
1993 870,730 $130.25 196 28,329 145
1994 928,240 $106.68 154 21,056 137
1995 1,037,610 $93.31 159 22,844 144
Passenger Demand CPI Adjusted Airfare Weekly Nonstop Freq. (August) Weekly Seat Capacity (August) Average Aircraft SizeYear ORD-SFO ORD-OAK Total ORD-SFO ORD-OAK W.Average ORD-SFO ORD-OAK Total ORD-SFO ORD-OAK Total ORD-SFO I ORD-OAK Total1987 585,460 118,510 703,970 $212.71 $213.85 $212.90 112 35 147 22,379 4,893 27,272 200 140 1861988 648,620 109,520 758,140 $180.12 $190.35 $181.60 123 21 144 24,861 3,059 27,920 202 146 1941989 583,300 112,790 696,090 $279.92 $288.03 $281.24 109 28 137 24,363 4,088 28,451 224 146 2081990 609,970 140,770 750,740 $293.01 $287.14 $291.91 117 56 173 24,913 8,330 33,243 213 149 1921991 604,710 113,990 718,700 $269.72 $280.29 $271.39 118 28 146 27,206 4,046 31,252 231 145 2141992 743,890 124,950 868,840 $226.53 $245.36 $229.24 126 28 154 29,267 4,970 34,237 232 178 2221993 669,820 133,510 803,330 $264.78 $261.22 $264.19 132 28 160 29,297 4,970 34,267 222 178 2141994 720,960 118,820 839,780 $261.94 $264.46 $262.30 140 28 168 30,436 4,641 35,077 217 166 209
1995 742,240 118,220 860,460 $256.94 $254.30 $256.58 138 28 166 30,489 3,444 33,933 221 123 204
.... , ..
J.
Passenger Demand CPI Adjusted Airfare Weekly Nonstop Freq. (August) Weekly Seat Capacity (August)
Year DFW-EWR DFW-JFK DFW-LGA Total DFW-EWR DFW-JFK DFW-LGA W.Average DFW-EWR DFW-JFK DFW-LGA Total DFW-EWR DFW-JFK DFW-LGA Total
1987 312,440 59,680 555,900 928,020 $232.92 $177.71 $223.84 $223.93 49 21 87 157 9,170 3,101 18,290 30,561
1988 338,410 54,050 544,360 936,820 $253.29 $192.98 $250.89 $248.41 70 14 91 175 13,594 2,114 18,752 34,460
1989 311,040 84,070 467,980 863,090 $306.27 $181.12 $315.90 $299.30 56 35 90 181 11,508 5,285 18,988 35,781
1990 343,500 69,560 554,650 967,710 $317.50 $206.08 $327.11 $315.00 70 21 90 181 13,384 3,101 19,170 35,655
1991 331,130 60,600 513,280 905,010 $297.57 $172.53 $313.71 $298.35 69 22 90 181 13,144 3,376 18,807 35,327
1992 331,140 63,300 532,870 927,310 $268.21 $209.07 $274.35 $267.70 63 34 104 201 9,520 4,978 19,169 33,667
1993 316,600 44,990 515,490 877,080 $331.39 $247.23 $342.67 $333.70 70 21 97 188 11,746 3,535 17,138 32,419
1994 333,080 46,360 531,690 911,130 $325.12 $228.29 $323.50 $319.25 83 21 119 223 12,570 3,745 19,586 35,901
1995 387,610 39,230 508,310 935,150 $281.41 $229.21 $320.12 $300.26 91 21 161 273 14,490 3,052 22,750 40,292
Average Aircraft Size
Year DFW-EWR DFW-JFK DFW-LGA Total
1987 187 148 210 195
1988 194 151 206 197
1989 206 151 211 198
1990 191 148 213 197
1991 190 153 209 195
1992 151 146 184 167
1993 168 168 177 172
1994 151 178 165 161
1995 159 145 141 148
Year
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
LAS-JFK
Demand Airfare Freqeuncy Capacity A/C Size
65,910 $212.96 0 0 0
116,920 $204.10 14 2,590 185
164,820 $190.58 14 2,590 185
227,720 $176.90 14 3,997 286
211,240 $156.23 14 2,660 190
224,620 $169.88 14 2,660 190
247,210 $164.08 14 2,660 190
271,280 $168.99 14 2,660 190
262,460 $166.58 14 2,660 190
'0' 1
ORD-PHX
Year Demand Airfare Freqeuncy Capacity A/C Size
1987 512,970 $120.40 98 15,519 158
1988 572,020 $122.71 78 13,206 169
1989 446,820 $190.13 77 13,762 179
1990 551,650 $173.72 96 16,463 171
1991 639,190 $152.23 90 13,234 147
1992 574,750 $168.29 91 13,678 150
1993 581,500 $185.17 84 14,161 169
1994 644,990 $164.51 97 14,075 145
1995 720,870 $136.10 98 15,330 156
BOS-ORD
Year Demand Airfare Freqeuncy Capacity A/C Size
1987 593,910 $154.77 116 25,125 217
1988 604,630 $115.60 135 27,166 201
1989 585,080 $154.67 109 22,706 208
1990 602,880 $196.36 107 23,105 216
1991 655,150 $168.80 121 24,309 201
1992 666,450 $189.42 123 23,466 191
1993 659,200 $220.18 136 25,593 188
1994 692,050 $190.28 158 26,414 167
1995 734,430 $198.59 207 31,045 150
Passenger Demand CPI Adjusted Airfare Weekly Nonsto Freq. (August) Weekly Seat Capacity (August)
Year EWR-PBI JFK-PBI LGA-PBI Total EWR-PBI JFK-PBI LGA-PBI W.Average EWR-PBI JFK-PBI LGA-PBI Total EWR-PBI JFK-PBI LGA-PBI Total
1987 395,460 142,370 579,570 1,117,400 $112.19 $109.46 $123.74 $117.83 35 14 42 91 5,740 1,890 6,468 14,098
1988 490,300 119,490 688,780 1,298,570 $116.44 $110.28 $128.90 $122.48 56 14 49 119 7,882 2,114 7,637 17,633
1989 447,290 34,540 733,530 1,215,360 $131.75 $136.42 $143.78 $139.15 42 0 42 84 5,166 0 6,552 11,718
1990 558,660 58,220 889,980 1,506,860 $112.66 $133.17 $124.46 $120.42 35 14 70 119 5,208 2,044 10,367 17,619
1991 475,370 14,310 818,850 1,308,530 $128.89 $136.93 $141.26 $136.72 35 0 62 97 5,210 0 8,982 14,192
1992 499,470 27,090 757,830 1,284,390 $129.06 $120.62 $145.22 $138.42 35 14 55 104 4,934 1,988 8,488 15,410
1993 462,570 24,670 691,910 1,179,150 $127.21 $136.25 $144.44 $137.51 34 0 56 90 4,938 0 8,483 13,421
1994 637,070 63,110 718,480 1,418,660 $110.37 $123.60 $123.32 $117.52 49 7 42 98 7,665 812 6,406 14,883
1995 621,720 59,630 681,480 1,362,830 $122.42 $132.79 $130.00 $126.66 49 0 41 90 7,140 0 6,046 13,186
Year
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Average Aircraft Size
EWR-PBI JFK-PBI LGA-PBI Total
164 135 154 155
141 151 156 148
123 0 156 140
149 146 148 148
149 0 145 146
141 142 154 148
145 0 151 149
156 116 153 152
146 0 147 147
ORD-MCO
Year Demand Airfare Fregeuncy Capacity A/C Size
1987 369,310 $127.90 42 7,875 188
1988 441,830 $106.32 56 8,638 154
1989 426,600 $139.46 56 8,515 152
1990 492,420 $135.59 42 7,175 171
1991 514,270 $142.02 49 7,560 154
1992 563,950 $151.88 56 9,569 171
1993 552,940 $153.03 70 12,208 174
1994 588,220 $126.41 70 10,500 150
1995 597,340 $127.14 71 11,230 158
Passenger Demand CPI Adjusted Airfare Weekly Nonstop Freq. (August) Weekly Seat Ca acity (August)
Year EWR-TPA JFK-TPA LGA-TPA Total EWR-TPA JFK-TPA LGA-TPA W.Average EWR-TPA JFK-TPA LGA-TPA Total EWR-TPA JFK-TPA LGA-TPA Total
1987 305,500 269,490 243,750 818,740 $146.77 $144.29 $159.89 $149.86 21 41 28 90 3,409 6,107 4,151 13,667
1988 396,600 192,400 361,550 950,550 $153.49 $144.32 $162.93 $155.22 42 35 49 126 5,882 5,285 7,063 18,230
1989 359,080 122,400 376,370 857,850 $166.72 $155.93 $173.36 $168.10 42 21 42 105 5,600 3,171 6,006 14,777
1990 449,830 130,390 474,500 1,054,720 $136.35 $115.54 $139.76 $135.31 49 35 63 147 6,762 5,131 8,624 20,517
1991 377,800 70,600 399,150 847,550 $158.76 $135.23 $168.07 $161.18 41 28 62 131 5,658 4,102 8,688 18,448
1992 372,460 57,240 371,230 800,930 $160.30 $156.99 $170.11 $164.61 41 14 55 110 5,772 1,988 8,007 15,767
1993 413,760 102,990 315,570 832,320 $148.03 $135.53 $165.72 $153.19 48 28 41 117 6,926 3,836 5,978 16,740
1994 537,310 125,250 375,950 1,038,510 $110.82 $109.22 $126.15 $116.18 48 21 42 111 8,404 2,884 5,698 16,986
1995 462,500 119,630 370,480 952,610 $128.72 $118.52 $128.18 $127.23 49 21 33 103 7,224 2,912 4,612 14,748
SFO-HNL
Year Demand Airfare Freqeuncy Capacity A/C Size
1987 528,700 $178.61 86 26,401 307
1988 777,300 $164.10 91 26,479 291
1989 763,970 $156.46 95 27,244 287
1990 856,760 $150.42 88 26,285 299
1991 806,260 $170.40 85 24,688 290
1992 818,770 $166.77 85 25,014 294
1993 854,500 $156.67 80 24,351 304
1994 798,660 $153.98 78 24,251 311
1995 771,000 $155.37 58 17,516 302
Ili, W" I W " M " " ..fis " iW .... .. ...
Year
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Average Aircraft Size
EWR-TPA JFK-TPA LGA-TPA Total
162 149 148 152
140 151 144 145
133 151 143 141
138 147 137 140
138 147 140 141
141 142 146 143
144 137 146 143
175 137 136 153
147 139 140 143
Year
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
ANC-SEA
Demand Airfare Freqeuncy Capacity A/C Size
204,130 $292.78 147 21,175 144
203,970 $292.66 133 20,083 151
193,040 $268.06 147 22,169 151
304,430 $227.65 168 25,172 150
327,950 $225.33 193 29,510 153
509,900 $161.12 227 33,700 148
444,100 $181.94 234 34,950 149
508,870 $158.59 205 30,587 149
572,130 $175.19 191 29,754 156
Passenger Demand CPI Adjusted Airfare Weekly Nonstop Freq. (August) Weekly Seat Capacity (August) Average Aircraft Size
Year LAX-BWI LAX-IAD Total LAX-BWI LAX-lAD W.Average LAX-BWI LAX-lAD Total LAX-BWI LAX-lAD Total LAX-BWI LAX-lAD Total
1987 171,860 311,640 483,500 $197.98 $271.07 $245.09 0 55 55 0 12,325 12,325 0 224 224
1988 184,230 359,500 543,730 $211.59 $289.92 $263.38 14 55 69 2,800 11,466 14,266 200 208 207
1989 181,060 559,960 741,020 $246.48 $283.31 $274.31 21 69 90 4,200 14,196 18,396 200 206 204
1990 195,110 531,160 726,270 $256.38 $301.70 $289.52 21 62 83 3,262 14,201 17,463 155 229 210
1991 198,160 522,350 720,510 $242.12 $280.86 $270.20 21 56 77 3,836 13,531 17,367 183 242 226
1992 191,620 599,030 790,650 $213.71 $246.97 $238.91 21 63 84 2,688 14,847 17,535 128 236 209
1993 197,040 541,760 738,800 $232.92 $295.84 $279.06 21 56 77 3,220 11,860 15,080 153 212 196
1994 249,520 537,800 787,320 $203.95 $277.70 $254.33 21 63 84 3,094 14,350 17,444 147 228 208
1995 284,010 567,780 851,790 $188.46 $265.77 $239.99 21 63 84 4,373 13,398 17,771 208 213 212
ORD-DEN
Year Demand Airfare Freqeuncy Capacity A/C Size
1987 514,860 $136.57 174 30,412 175
1988 520,660 $103.68 167 32,180 193
1989 479,000 $186.15 157 29,362 187
1990 537,710 $186.41 158 29,339 186
1991 577,420 $161.67 152 27,211 179
1992 618,950 $168.13 153 26,399 173
1993 652,330 $165.23 153 30,363 198
1994 859,810 $110.60 153 30,993 203
1995 763,330 $140.65 134 25,909 193
'Q nrn -M oa .M
Year
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Demand Airfare Freqeuncy Capacity A/C Size
545,490 $174.35 139 21,342 154
514,810 $219.52 151 24,348 161
488,500 $252.56 144 22,535 156
596,940 $248.02 158 24,861 157
605,030 $216.31 145 25,440 175
641,070 $222.05 137 23,101 169
636,330 $258.97 203 28,148 139
814,230 $183.90 192 27,488 143
799,960 $198.64 192 27,222 142
ORD-DFW
BOS-SFO
Year Demand Airfare Freqeuncy Capacity A/C Size
1987 488,950 $261.26 14 3,934 281
1988 511,140 $256.48 14 3,920 280
1989 566,330 $294.66 14 3,458 247
1990 553,310 $293.01 28 6,790 243
1991 562,280 $257.12 35 7,325 209
1992 590,370 $240.02 28 5,432 194
1993 604,000 $266.43 35 7,621 218
1994 612,620 $274.06 35 7,371 211
1995 676,560 $274.22 36 7,758 216
ROOFM Ivaf-MNWII
Year
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
SFO-IAD
Demand Airfare Freqeuncy Capacity A/C Size
168,240 $243.72 28 7,931 283
202,020 $262.12 28 7,280 260
449,650 $304.91 28 7,333 262
455,640 $317.56 28 6,706 240
469,810 $285.81 28 7,637 273
510,490 $263.99 35 9,499 271
505,980 $298.09 35 10,906 312
581,640 $292.93 35 11,032 315
553,670 $292.70 35 10,381 297
Consumter-Price-Index Adjusted Airfares in terms of 1995 Dollars
I Year
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
CPI Adjusted Fare
LAX-EWR
$158.44
$168.97
$220.69
$232.61
$221.31
$199.49
$243.18
$233.95
$231.66
105.40
108.70
114.10
120.50
123.80
126.50
130.40
134.30
139.10
LAX-JFK
$289.37
$319.72
$319.24
$319.85
$273.74
$261.46
$294.64
$262.63
$237.58
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
LAX-JFK
$219.27
$249.84
$261.86
$277.08
$243.63
$237.77
$276.21
$253.57
$237.58
MIA-JFK
$111.54
$119.60
$132.44
$110.29
$130.14
$133.87
$127.26
$109.10
$107.12
CPI LAX-EWR
$209.10
$216.23
$269.05
$268.51
$248.67
$219.36
$259.41
$242.31
$231.66
Original Fare CPI Adjusted Fare
Year EWR-SFO JFK-SFO CPI EWR-SFO JFK-SFO
1987 $175.63 $235.57 105.40 $231.79 $310.89
1988 $178.25 $267.12 108.70 $228.10 $341.83
1989 $236.00 $259.82 114.10 $287.71 $316.75
1990 $246.76 $268.97 120.50 $284.85 $310.49
1991 $238.12 $241.02 123.80 $267.55 $270.81
1992 $222.65 $233.20 126.50 $244.83 $256.43
1993 $262.56 $293.45 130.40 $280.07 $313.03
1994 $258.02 $275.31 134.30 $267.25 $285.15
1995 $255.41 $259.80 139.10 $255.41 $259.80
MIA-EWR
$139.91
$153.91
$161.80
$133.04
$150.97
$155.97
$152.09
$118.11
$122.64
105.40
108.70
114.10
120.50
123.80
126.50
130.40
134.30
139.10
Original Fare CPI Adjusted Fare
Year EWR-MCO JFK-MCO LGA-MCO CPI EWR-MCO JFK-MCO LGA-MCO
1987 $103.39 $102.87 $105.18 105.40 $136.45 $135.76 $138.81
1988 $105.65 $104.56 $105.36 108.70 $135.19 $133.81 $134.83
1989 $112.71 $119.33 $116.20 114.10 $137.40 $145.47 $141.66
1990 $103.57 $100.55 $105.78 120.50 $119.56 $116.08 $122.11
1991 $127.26 $114.98 $133.41 123.80 $142.99 $129.19 $149.90
1992 $128.00 $129.53 $133.63 126.50 $140.75 $142.43 $146.94
1993 $109.37 $121.31 $129.07 130.40 $116.67 $129.40 $137.68
1994 $104.59 $107.47 $115.60 134.30 $108.32 $111.31 $119.74
1995 $118.73 $120.28 $127.29 139.10 $118.73 $120.28 $127.29
CPI Adjusted Fare
I Original Fare
T -77
MIA-JFK
$147.21
$153.05
$161.46
$127.31
$146.23
$147.20
$135.75
$113.00
$107.12
MIA-LGA
$158.36
$161.89
$161.44
$135.31
$166.88
$172.60
$178.64
$141.47
$151.71
MIA-EWR
$106.02
$120.27
$132.72
$115.25
$134.37
$141.84
$142.58
$114.03
$122.64
MIA-LGA
$119.99
$126.51
$132.43
$117.21
$148.53
$156.97
$167.47
$136.59
$151.71
Appendix B:
iI
Original Fare
Year
CPI Adjusted Fare
EWR-SJU
$116.34
$148.22
$161.24
$166.10
$174.45
$171.41
$157.78
$151.13
$137.76
EWR-SJU
$153.54
$189.67
$196.56
$191.74
$196.01
$188.49
$168.31
$156.53
$137.76
105.40
108.70
114.10
120.50
123.80
126.50
130.40
134.30
139.10
ATL-LGA
$147.28
$186.47
$193.00
$196.58
$204.24
$211.99
$215.07
$182.23
$228.13
CPI
105.40
108.70
114.10
120.50
123.80
126.50
130.40
134.30
139.10
Original 
Fare
ATL-EWR
$135.31
$192.83
$193.62
$189.58
$202.28
$175.50
$129.57
$111.65
$138.43
ATL-JFK
$117.08
$127.78
$147.58
$141.22
$140.48
$138.47
$138.45
$126.07
$145.02
CPI Adjusted Fare
ATL-JFK
$154.51
$163.52
$179.92
$163.02
$157.84
$152.26
$147.69
$130.581
$145.02
LAX-HNL
Year Orig. Fare CPI CPI Fare
1987 $132.04 105.40 $174.25
1988 $125.04 108.70 $160.00
1989 $136.48 114.10 $166.39
1990 $135.42 120.50 $156.32
1991 $163.97 123.80 $184.23
1992 $162.71 126.50 $178.92
1993 $152.59 130.40 $162.77
1994 $149.91 134.30 $155.27
1995 $149.59 139.10 $149.59
Original Fare CPI Adjusted Fare
Year FLL-EWR FLL-JFK FLL-LGA CPI FLL-EWR FLL-JFK FLL-LGA
1987 $111.68 $110.28 $117.03 105.40 $147.39 $145.54 $154.44
1988 $116.95 $114.65 $122.96 108.70 $149.65 $146.72 $157.35
1989 $129.53 $128.85 $139.15 114.10 $157.91 $157.09 $169.63
1990 $112.70 $105.61 $115.75 120.50 $130.09 $121.91 $133.61
1991 $133.21 $126.45 $144.34 123.80 $149.67 $142.08 $162.18
1992 $128.31 $130.25 $141.00 126.50 $141.09 $143.23 $155.05
1993 $117.94 $125.79 $140.29 130.40 $125.80 $134.18 $149.65
1994 $110.71 $114.48 $121.18 134.30 $114.67 $118.57 $125.51
1995 $123.60 $117.52 $130.84 139.10 $123.60 $117.52 $130.84
Year
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Year
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
JFK-SJU
$115.46
$143.79
$147.12
$155.99
$156.93
$156.48
$153.03
$140.63
$133.20
JFK-SJU
$152.38
$184.01
$179.35
$180.07
$176.32
$172.07
$163.24
$145.66
$133.20
ATL-EWR
$178.57
$246.76
$236.04
$218.84
$227.27
$192.98
$138.22
$115.64
$138.43
ATL-LGA
$194.37
$238.62
$235.29
$226.92
$229.48
$233.11
$229.42
$188.74
$228.13
Original Fare
,r=,•===•,== • •4=
CPI Adjusted Fare
ORD-LAX
$139.57
$130.77
$194.63
$214.71
$196.23
$187.55
$231.39
$222.64
$229.93
ORD-ONT
$150.69
$149.63
$195.69
$218.28
$190.18
$178.27
$209.81
$207.43
$205.10
CPI
105.40
108.70
114.10
120.50
123.80
126.50
130.40
134.30
139.10
LAX-SEA
Orig. Fare CPI CPI Fare
$125.13 105.40 $165.14
$121.54 108.70 $155.53
$155.29 114.10 $189.31
$147.63 120.50 $170.42
$150.84 123.80 $169.49
$131.23 126.50 $144.30
$122.10 130.40 $130.25
$103.00 134.30 $106.68
$93.31 139.10 $93.31
ORD-ONT
$198.87
$191.47
$238.57
$251.97
$213.69
$196.03
$223.81
$214.84
$205.10
Original Fare CPI Adjusted Fare
Year ORD-SFO ORD-OAK CPI ORD-SFO ORD-OAK
1987 $161.17 $162.04 105.40 $212.71 $213.85
1988 $140.75 $148.75 108.70 $180.12 $190.35
1989 $229.61 $236.26 114.10 $279.92 $288.03
1990 $253.83 $248.75 120.50 $293.01 $287.14
1991 $240.05 $249.46 123.80 $269.72 $280.29
1992 $206.01 $223.14 126.50 $226.53 $245.36
1993 $248.22 $244.88 130.40 $264.78 $261.22
1994 $252.91 $255.33 134.30 $261.94 $264.46
1995 $256.94 $254.30 139.10 $256.94 $254.30
DFW-JFK
$134.66
$150.81
$148.57
$178.52
$153.55
$190.13
$231.77
$220.41
$229.21
DFW-LGA
$169.61
$196.06
$259.13
$283.37
$279.20
$249.50
$321.24
$312.33
$320.12
CPI
105.40
108.70
114.10
120.50
123.80
126.50
130.40
134.30
139.10
CPI Adjusted Fare
DFW-JFK
$177.71
$192.98
$181.12
$206.08
$172.53
$209.07
$247.23
$228.29
$229.21
Year
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Year
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Year
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
DFW-EWR
$176.49
$197.93
$251.23
$275.04
$264.84
$243.91
$310.67
$313.90
$281.41
0, z AnNfý
Original Fare ORD-LAX$184.20$167 '34$237.27$247.85$220.48$206.23$246.83$230.60$229.93
AN,
Original Fare DFW-EVVR$232.92$253.29$306.27$317.50$297.57$268.21$331.39$325.12$281.41
DFW-LGA$223.84$250.89$315.90$327.11$313.71$274.35$342.67$323.50$320.12
Year
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Year
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
LAS-JFK
Orig. Fare CPI CPI Fare
$161.37 105.40 $212.96
$159.49 108.70 $204.10
$156.33 114.10 $190.58
$153.24 120.50 $176.90
$139.05 123.80 $156.23
$154.49 126.50 $169.88
$153.82 130.40 $164.08
$163.16 134.30 $168.99
$166.58 139.10 $166.58
ORD-PHX
Orig. Fare CPI CPI Fare
$91.23 105.40 $120.40
$95.89 108.70 $122.71
$155.96 114.10 $190.13
$150.49 120.50 $173.72
$135.49 123.80 $152.23
$153.04 126.50 $168.29
$173.59 130.40 $185.17
$158.84 134.30 $164.51
$136.10 139.10 $136.10
BOS-ORD
Year Orig. Fare CPI CPI Fare
1987 $154.77 105.40 $204.26
1988 $115.60 108.70 $147.93
1989 $154.67 114.10 $188.55
1990 $196.36 120.50 $226.67
1991 $168.80 123.80 $189.66
1992 $189.42 126.50 $208.29
1993 $220.18 130.40 $234.87
1994 $190.28 134.30 $197.08
1995 $198.59 139.10 $198.59
Original Fare CPI Adjusted Fare
Year EWR-PBI JFK-PBI LGA-PBI CPI EWR-PBI JFK-PBI LGA-PBI
1987 $112.19 $109.46 $123.74 105.40 $148.06 $144.45 $163.31
1988 $116.44 $110.28 $128.90 108.70 $149.01 $141.12 $164.95
1989 $131.75 $136.42 $143.78 114.10 $160.62 $166.31 $175.29
1990 $112.66 $133.17 $124.46 120.50 $130.05 $153.73 $143.68
1991 $128.89 $136.93 $141.26 123.80 $144.82 $153.85 $158.72
1992 $129.06 $120.62 $145.22 126.50 $141.92 $132.63 $159.68
1993 $127.21 $136.25 $144.44 130.40 $135.69 $145.34 $154.08
1994 $110.37 $123.60 $123.32 134.30 $114.32 $128.02 $127.73
1995 $122.42 $132.79 $130.00 139.10 $122.42 $132.79 $130.00
AS;
ORD-ORL
Orig. Fare CPI CPI Fare
$96.91 105.40 $127.90
$83.08 108.70 $106.32
$114.40 114.10 $139.46
$117.46 120.50 $135.59
$126.40 123.80 $142.02
$138.12 126.50 $151.88
$143.46 130.40 $153.03
$122.05 134.30 $126.41
$127.14 139.10 $127.14
EWVVR-TPA
$111.21
$119.94
$136.76
$118.12
$141.30
$145.78
$138.77
$107.00
$128.72
EWVR-TPA
$146.77
$153.49
$166.72
$136.35
$158.76
$160.30
$148.03
$110.82
$128.72
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CPI
105.40
108.70
114.10
120.50
123.80
126.50
130.40
134.30
139.10
$144.29
$144.32
$155.93
$115.54
$135.23
$156.99
$135.53
$109.22
$118.52
Year
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Year
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
SCPI Adjusted Fare
SFO-HNL
Orig. Fare CPI CPI Fare
$135.34 105.40 $178.61
$128.24 108.70 $164.10
$128.34 114.10 $156.46
$130.30 120.50 $150.42
$151.66 123.80 $170.40
$151.66 126.50 $166.77
$146.87 130.40 $156.67
$148.67 134.30 $153.98
$155.37 139.10 $155.37
Year
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
ANC-SEA
Orig. Fare CPI CPI Fare
$221.85 105.40 $292.78
$228.70 108.70 $292.66
$219.88 114.10 $268.06
$197.21 120.50 $227.65
$200.55 123.80 $225.33
$146.52 126.50 $161.12
$170.56 130.40 $181.94
$153.12 134.30 $158.59
$175.19 139.10 $175.19
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CPI Adjusted Fare77L 5K-TPA$159.89$162.93$173.36$139.76$168.07$170.11$165.72$126.15$128.18
JFK-TPA$109.33$112.78$127.90$100.09$120.35$142.77$127.05$105.46$118.52
LGA-TPA$121-15$127.32$142.21$121.07$149.58$154.71$155.36$121.80$128-18
4
Year
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Original Fare
I JFK-TPA I
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
105.40
108.70
114.10
120.50
123.80
126.50
130.40
134.30
139.10
CPI Adjusted Fare
LAX-BWI
$150.01
$165.35
$202.18
$222.09
$215.49
$194.36
$218.35
$196.91
$188.46
$265.77 $188.46 $265.77 $188.46
I
Year
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
BOS-SFO
Orig. Fare CPI CPI Fare
$197.96 105.40 $261.26
$200.43 108.70 $256.48
$241.70 114.10 $294.66
$253.83 120.50 $293.01
$228.84 123.80 $257.12
$218.28 126.50 $240.02
$249.76 130.40 $266.43
$264.60 134.30 $274.06
$274.22 139.10 $274.22
ORD-DEN
Orig. Fare CPI CPI Fare
$103.48 105.40 $136.57
$81.02 108.70 $103.68
$152.69 114.10 $186.15
$161.49 120.50 $186.41
$143.89 123.80 $161.67
$152.90 126.50 $168.13
$154.90 130.40 $165.23
$106.79 134.30 $110.60
$140.65 139.10 $140.65
ORD-DFW
Year Orig. Fare CPI CPI Fare
1987 $132.11 105.40 $174.35
1988 $171.54 108.70 $219.52
1989 $207.17 114.10 $252.56
1990 $214.86 120.50 $248.02
1991 $192.51 123.80 $216.31
1992 $201.94 126.50 $222.05
1993 $242.78 130.40 $258.97
1994 $177.55 134.30 $183.90
1995 $198.64 139.10 $198.64
km'422- Mt
LAX-IAD$205.40$226.56$232.39$261.36$249.96$224.60$277.34$268.121$265.771
LAX-LAD$271.07$289.92$283.31$301.70$280.86$246.97$295.84$277.70$265.77
LAX-BWvI$197.98$211.59$246.48$256.38$242.12$213.71$232.92$203.95$188.461
Year
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Original Fare
IYear
SFO-IAD
(
114
Orig. Fare CPI CPI Fare
$135.34 105.40 $178.61
$128.24 108.70 $164.10
$128.34 114.10 $156.46
$130.30 120.50 $150.42
$151.66 123.80 $170.40
$151.66 126.50 $166.77
$146.87 130.40 $156.67
$148.67 134.30 $153.98
199 54 37 139 10 $155 37
Year
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
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